ISTVAN HAJNAL
From Estates to Classes
ABSTRACT
This overview of the epochal Iransformation of Hungarian society from one of
estates to one of classes has been translated from the author‘ s contribution to the
probably best sythesis ofthe country‘ s history produced in inteTWar Hungary. 1 Even
if-.fifty years after its writing-several details ( especially statistics) would need
up-dating, it is such afine summary of the author’s views on social history that it
deserves a „renaissance,“ the more so as the founders of this joumal clzose Hajnal
as their model for „doing history.“ Concerning the history of the nobility, Hajnal
underlines the dijference between „western“ development, in which the elites (such
as the French nobility) acquired expertise to augment and replace their traditional
privilege, and the Hungarian story, in which the growth of „professionalism“ was
badly retarded. The author investigates in detail the fate of landownership: its
Iransformation from „feudal“ to modern propeny, and points out that the over-all
reforms-from Maria Theresa ’s to the revolutionary changes in 1848-did not solve
all the problems, neither for the landowning nobles nor for the tenant Uobbdgy)
peasants. It took decades oj Habsburg administration to son out many, though not
all, of residual issues.
Social classes based on the free play of forces and abilities instead of feudal (corporate,
stCJndisch) restrictions-this great emancipating enterprise ofthe nineteenth century brought
about the modern world with its marvelous achievements, never before seen in human
development. However, the mere release of force may still Ieave society on a primitive
Ievel. True class society may not develop even when stratification is engendered, not by
crude force, but by legally regulated competition of economic and political interests. This
was the case, for example, in the democracies of Antiquity.
164 History and Society 2
Wbile the origin of modern class society is emancipation, its creative power lies in
competent, expert work. Professionalism develops only from the social character of Iabor,
not from unbridled ambition for practical ends. The bases of professionalism were laid in
manifold social gradations during medieval and feudal times; these were then mightily
unfolded for rnagnificent purposes during the nineteenth century. The class society of every
culture is, therefore, defined by its own feudal prehistory. The project of society is
continuous, even if it suffers great transformations. While mankind believes itself to be
free in thought and choice, in fact, its historical past is at work.
Hence, to understand the transformation of Hungarian society to modemity we have to
start out with its feudal-corporatist stage. Until the end of the ancien rgime, Hungarian
society was unequivocally commanded by the nobility. While the prestige of the French
nobility was incomparably higher than that of Hungary, they played, even before the
revolution, a far less dominant role in public service (except for the military) or in private
economy. For French society was from the outset more complicated; thus the nobility’s
leadership demanded more care, and professional tasks were gradually released to experts.
In Hungarian society, will-power seems to have been sufficient for leadership, and even
wben nobles tumed to professional assistance, the experts remained under their command.
In France, stable historical-social traditions in all walks of life were coupled with professionalism;
in Hungary, unclear social organization was oriented to accidental needs and,
bence, conservative leadership. This also accounts for the mass character of the Hungarian
nobility: whoever once managed to rise above the commoners, stubbomly clung to noble
privilege, together with his kith and kin. Pre-revolutionary France had 26,000 noble
families, comprising some 140,000 members in a population of 25 million; Hungary, with
its seven million inhabitants, had 65,000 noble farnilies, i.e., 320,000 souls. In France every
I 80th person was a noble-in Hungary every twentieth. Only Poland had proportionately
more nobles: 1,400,000 outof 14 million. In 1839, Hungary had 136,000 noble households,
with some 680,000 members out of a total 12 million inhabitants; thus, the nobility grew
faster than the population at !arge. In Poland, the noble Status of all those who rose in civil
and military service, or who acquired respectable wealth, was customarily accepted. In
Hungary, on the other hand, farnilies might live like nobles for generations without passing
through the formal procedure necessary for admission into the nobility. True, in southem
Hungary commoners-even craftsmen, tavemkeepers, or stewards-were ennobled en masse
wben they purcbased a plot of auctioned-off treasury property, for only nobles were entitled
to full ownersbip of real estate. While westem-particularly French-nobles lost their
privilege if lbey pursued gainful occupation, Hungarian nobles included not only professionals,
but craftsmen, teamsters, and even footmen as weil. There were actually cases when
a nobleman was a hired band at a peasant’s tenant farm. About half of the nobility lived
the life of peasants, tilling their small plots; some held servile land and owed servile dues
to their landlords. Westemers were bemused by the sight of these „sandalled“ nobles, wben
Hajnal: From Estates to Oasses 165
they appeared at the last feudal levy in 1809, in peasant garb, riding bareback on their
horses.
lt seems as if leadership in Hungarian society was never based on expert skills, but
pertained as a privilege to those who somehow achieved higher positions in society. West
of Hungary, nobles were taxed from the seventeenth century onwards, although differently
from peasants. While nobles were taxed in medieval Hungary, in the eighteenth century
noble exemption from all taxes becarne a cardinal tenet. Nobles were exempt from local
or seignorial j urisdiction, and even the county court bad only limited rights over them. They
enjoyed typical privileges of medieval nobilities as Iords and guardians of servile populations:
for exarnple, no troops could be billeted on their premises, they served only in the
noble levy. Hungarian nobles protested against being included in the census around 1800
and have a nurober placed on their houses. When elsewhere democratic reforms began 10
transform representative governments, in Hungary the poorer nobility acquired a greater
political roJe, supported by the court, against the oppositional moyenne nobility. Up to that
time the county assernblies were led by traditionally accepted families, and the votes were
„weighed,“ not counted, just as in England. In 1819 the govemment ordered the counting
of votes and coerced, by hook and crook, money and wine, the poorer nobility to appear at
meetings to vote down their enlightened propertied fellows. Alliances, called kolompdria
(company), originally organized to fight tax exemption, were available 10 the highest bidder
on an issue. It was as if the Polish experience of earlier centuries were resurrected in this
forced recruitment of noble masses in public Iife.
However, in this form, the political role of the poorer nobility was only a passing episode.
Hungarian nobles differed from their Polish fellows. Tbe szlachtic never engaged in trades
or profession „below his dignity,“ but lived offbis magnate patron and bis serfs, reaping
the fruits of privilege. The Hungarian „one-plot noble“ lived from the Iabor of bis hands,
and his privileges had little practical importance; they merely gave him a certain freedom
to shape his life. Yet, although the nobles‘ democracies meant that society was guided by
superficial conventions rather than by the traditional circumspect Ieadership, it also meant
that elites did not gain their position by crude, ruthless force. There was no noble
rzeczpospolita in Russia or Romania. Although Russian nobles were merely a seventieth
part of the population, theyb ad no western character, nor did Rumanian boyars. They were
ruthless exploiters of these beneath them, servants of the state power above them. Russian
and Romania peasants reached tbe nadir of their fate precisely around 1800, due 10
economic developmenl, as noble Iords began driving their serfs to manufacturing activities
away from bome and family. To a minor extent Polish Iords did the same, making their
country manors mandatory markets and their urban houses workshops for servile orced
Iabor.
The economic „inertia“ of the Hungarian nobility on the marketplace can thus be seen as
a „western“ trait. The great landowning magnates lost their position precisely when
capitalistic production should have enhanced it. With the exception of a few founders of
166 History and Society 2
mines, foundries or factories, there were no Prussian-English entrepreneurs among thern.
The latifundia rernained rather traditional, „soft“ agrarian estates, and even the rnost agile
bailiff was unable to transform servile dues into anything resernbling a capitalist enterprise.
The social significance of the aristocratic courts ended with the eighteenth century.
Although people kept a watchful eye of tbe magnates‘ world, the propertied Iesser nobility
tended to push thern out of the county offices.
In early nineteentb-century Hungary about 30,000 noble families enjoyed an annual
incorne above 500 florins and only sorne 3000 farnilies above 3000 florins, while a
Viennese court councillor received 3000 and a college professor 300-400 florins in salary.
The better off lesser nobility (bene possessionati) constituted an alrnost formally recognized
group within society, especially in regard to eligibility for office. It was traditional that
certain families supplied tbe vice-counts, others the rnagistrates, again others the jurors or
the salaried offleials (notary, surgeon, surveyor, etc.). These assignrnents were not based
on property alone, but rather on specific selection processes with the local comrnunity,
where farnily tradition was considered a kind of expert training for the given office. The
county comrnunity was, therefore, not a rnere association of noble self-il1terest under the
leadership of the powerful. To the contrary, family prestige gave the offleials sufficient
standing to defend the county’s and its peoples‘ interests, even against a rieb rnagnate.
Special forms of courtesy developed in county docurnents; specific official rituals reigned
at the county court as expressions of unwritten duties, and as regulators of unbridled
ernotions.
The official and social duties of the rnoyenne nobility demanded the schooling of their
sons, at least on the secondary Ievel. After 1800 few rnen were elected to office without a
degree in Iaw, even though this was not formally required. Thus, education had a social
and traditional based in Hungary-unlike Russia where, as late as the eighteenth century,
noble boys had to be drafted by force to leam the alphabet. A leading figure among
Hungarian nobles was the „justice of the bench“ (tdblabir6, Tafelrichter), who, having
acquired sorne legal training and rid hirnself of the dust of his farrn, offered expert counsel
in the county’s court, in adrninistration or in arbitration procedures. Usually experienced
rnen or former magistrates were given (after 1839, elected to) this post. Complaints usually
Iist their conservatisrn, not their corruption or incornpetence.
Thus there was a certain intellectualization in Hungary-and this was the greatest achievernent
of the eighteenth century. The new intellectualisrn did not break through the
crevices of traditional society like a wild growth, nor seep in like poisoned gas, no take the
form of corrupt bureaucratisrn as in Russia. On the contrary, the old prestigious leadership
gradually became professional, with the increasing roJe of the rnoyenne nobility reflecting
this process.
Western officialdorn (in France, for example) ernerged in response to the varied needs of
society; it carne about not by decree but through historical developrnent within feudal
society. Magistracy carne to belong to a traditional group of families, honored by certain
Hajnal: From Estates to Oasses 167
noble privileges (noblesse de robe). They became tbe arbiters of matters ranging from tbe
administration of justice through economic questions to cultural issues. All otber, more
mobile and modern types of civil service and tbe various professions developed out of this
strata of magistrates. Even tbe free professions developed in tbe framework of traditional
feudal apprenticeship; tbe schools served mainly for the refmement of tbe mind. Professionalism
had tbus, even witbout riches, a strong social position with recognized privileges
and honorable distinctions. Then, by tbe mid-eighteentb century, professional training left
the feudal womb: colleges were founded for it. However, one must bear in mind tbat tbe
curricula, as well as the social rank and Obligation of tbe professions, were consequences
of earlier development.
A ‚Justice of Bench‘ ( Tdblabir6)
168 History and Society 2
As we have seen, Hungary, too, possessed certain social bases for professionalism.
However, the wide lower strata of society were relatively formless and generated few
structured professional bodies. While many peasant and burgher boys went to school, for
a long time only the priesthood (or the clerical-teaching professions) could secure them
positions comparable to the nobility. The barely structured social system ofHungary does
not seem to bave demanded minute professional expertise, but rat11er legal and rhetorical
faculties: debating, persuading,judging and decision-making. Even the chief chancellor of
the counties (j6jegyz6) remained long a salaried position, not coveted by the better families,
for its main task was to implement expert measures, rather tban to enforce political
decisions. The spread of legal training reflecting the growing domination of the nobility.
Only the legal profession had some kind of feudal precedent through inscription at the bar.
A Hungarian Noble at the End of the Nineteenth Century
/
Hajnal: From &tates to Oasses 169
Non-noble barristers, engineers, doctors or professors became honoratiores by viftue of
their diplomas and university training, without any historical basis. There were many
complaints against advocates delaying suits and agitating the commoners. And the honoratiores
often lamented that neither the nobles nor the commoners accepted them as their
fellows.
This, the conflict between the new professionalism and traditional nobility was neither
radical nor rebellious, since every noble who wanted to be somebody regarded hirnself as
an intellectual anyway. The best part of eighteenth-century moyenne nobility was definitely
reform-minded; their parliamentary projects were quite impressive and-only the European
reactionary wave stopped their conscientious efforts for social reform. Below the surface,
however, just as elsewhere in Europe, deep and rapid transformations were underway.
Letters and numbers were gradually replacing the traditional frame of life. Following the
foreign patter, „professional“ careers were open to all wbo beld a degree. Thus, young
people, nobles and non-nobles alike, rusbed to them en masse-so much so that even the
enlightened Joseph li contemplated imposing a serious Iimitation on the higber scbooling
of commoners. But the most restless segment of society were those lesser nobles wbo now
could acbieve a new prestige through education. Bolstered by their ancient nobility as well
as their new degrees, they preached liberalism and opposed the conservative magistratementality
of their better-off fellows. Avenues leading out of the old feudal-corporate world
were quickly opening up: in the 1830s several counties extended the note to bonoratiores
and, in 1843, a law granted full rigbts to civil office to non-nobles –this, bowever, counted
Iittle in county elections.
The „third estate“ of early nineteenth-century Hungary consisted of some fivescore royal
cities with five to six thousand inhabitants. Furthermore, there were ten times as many
market -towns, so that around 184 7 urban dwellers amounted to a million and a half, maybe
one ninth of the country’s total population. Actually, the market-towns were hardly more
than huge villages which acquired by contract a limited autonomy frcm their seigneur.
B urgesses in the strict sense were only a fragment of this urban population. In 1829. Pest
had 50,000 inhabitants out of whicb 22,198 were taxpayers, but there were only 1673
burghers of full urban liberty. Actually, few townspeople cared to acquire burgess Status.
Fees were high, and the rigbts thus acquired did not mean much: they were not needed for
licenses in trades or conunerce and secured no separate court of law for their bearers. Thus,
independent urban economic policies did not exist for long.
The right to bear arms may still have given some special standing to the privileged
burgesses. Civic shooting associations recalled the burgbers‘ old military duties, and
burgher militias were formed during the Napoleonic wars. Also, on certain days a few
burgesses still had the monopoly on public wine sale. Otherwise, ci vic rights meant mainly
that the old house- and vineyard-owners were better able to reject newcomers. Althougb
these rigbts also may have involved claims to urban revenues and municipal Offices.
170 History aod Society 2
nevertbeless, municipal enterprises like taverns, slaughterhouses, and brickstone plants
were sold, without qualms, to the highest bidders, even to Jews.
A few generations earlier, major matters were still decided by general meetings of
burgesses-but this practice feil into abeyance, and elected burghers or city councils took
over urban affairs. Mayors and city captains were still elected annually by the „elected
burghers;“ councilors and fmancial officers, on the other band, held their positions for life.
As they were elected by nomination of tbe council, the urban magistracy functioned in fact
by cooption; this was true of the few dozen „elected burghers“ as weil. Lesser offleials were
simply appointed by the city council, as were urban deputies to the diet. These deputies
usually retained their position for several sessions-as long as they could tolerate the
frustrating task. Since all the privileged cities of lbe kingdom together had only two votes
in the lower chamber, most urban deputies attended only as silent onlookers. Thus, while
many an urban magistracy presented itself with great circumstance and treated the common
townsfolk with disdain, there were no precise ways to define the upper strata of urbanites,
the burghers, or the council: they seem to have been a group of successful social climbers
who managed to stick to their places by inertia–even though the governrnent kept putting
its Supervisors on tbeirnecks and the country nobility refused to mingle with these „uncouth
townsfolk.“ In fact, country gentlernen retained their disdain for the pettiness of urban
administration almost up to the present day.
Professionalism, primarily legal expertise, entered city councils as weil. The Pest council
of 1822 consisted witb one exception of lawyers and form er urban administrators (however,
in Szeged the majority of councilors remained craftsmen or farmers weil in the 1830s).
Lesser nobles also joined urban councils, and in some places the traditional ratio again
developed between noble and burgher members. In turn, burgher councilors werc often
ennobled, usually for political services.
In Hungary as elsewhere, new developments in urban life began outside of the old burgher
strata. Even craftsmen left the old social framework: in 1829 Pest possessed 2886 master
craftsmen and merely 1673 burgesses; in Debrecen there were 1875 masters and 1228 fully
privileged burghers. In the eighteenth century every craft hurried to establish its guild, in
order to Iimit the number of independent masters and set prices for their wares. In vain, for
these restrictions bad already lost their meaning when the guild ceased to be a school of
fine crafts and the master an expert craftsman. The counties responded with limitations on
price-hikes, and ever more craftsmen worked outside the guilds. Not only was it difficult
to get into tbe old guilds, but many a master saw no reason to pay the high membership
fees. The government (after temporarily suspending the guilds UIIder Joseph II) used the
institution merely for administrative purposes. After 1813, anyone was permitted to acquire
masters‘ standing and even licensing was entrusted to non-guild craftsmen. Jews were
granted the right to form guilds as early as 1805. Nevertheless, Jewish handicrafts
developed slowly; in 1839 only 50 of Pest’s 7000 Jews were craftsmen.
Hajnal: From Estates to Oasses 171
The eighteenth century saw the sudden expansion of cities all over Europe, as small
regulated islands of trades and professions grew into great organizational centers. In the
West, successful entrepreneurship was not merely a question of capital, but was built upon
Iong developed, historically rooted organizations of work. The craftsmen’s traditional
mastery developed to the Ievel of professional knowledge, thus providing a basis for expert
enterprise with mass employment. In Hungary, cities grew up as wen, but with the
overwhelming role of capital and mass Iabor. Production was heavily dependent on
entrepreneurial capital, particularly for raw materials and major contracts (e.g., construction,
military supplies). Handicrafts, even if organized in guilds, represented not so much
the integration of various skills, but rather a Iabor pool for average-quality domestic
production. In 1838, Hungary possessed some 250,000 craftsmen inside and outside the
guilds; in 1847 there were 334,000-that is, one craftsman for every 45 (or, later, every 35)
people. For quite a while, Hungarians were employed in factories mainly as laborers, while
skilled workers came from abroad. In 1838 453 so-called factories were listed, including
papermills, glassworks and foundries; in 1847 their number grew to 528 with altogether
23,400 „regular factory men.“
The Hungarian route to rapid commercial development suggests something of a detour
around professionalism. Commerce was partly wholesale, partly pedlarism with very few
stable, expertly specialized shops. Entire populations-Jews, Greeks, Armenians-were
peddlers. In western Europe wholesale trade, like retail trade, grew out of guild commerce
by organizing the expert, refined distribution of specific commodities on a !arge scale. In
Hungary, however, no enterprise, no license was needed for wholesale activity. Nevertheless,
there were some ineffective attempts at regulation as Iate as 1812, in response to the
great fortunes that were being amassed by foreigners. Joseph li (1780-1790) wanted to
„restrict“ Jewish commercial activity to pedlarism and wholesale activity; the Pest merchants
demanded thesame. Thus, in 1822, outof65 Pest wholesalers, 42 wereJews. Jewish
peddlers eventually gained access to weekly fairs, which previously had been restricted to
specially licensed burghers and fanners. In 1828 a special committee was formed in defense
of „genuine,“ that is, professional commerce with 114 members-out of 741 registered
merchants. Non-members , however, continued to be active in the „genuine“ branches of
commerce, and the majority of the committee members did not acquire civil rights. All this
points to the weakness of the social roots of the new urbanism. Development was most
conspicuous in those fields which did not demand profound and wid spread organization
of skilled Iabor.
Yet, we should bear in mind that Hungary compares favorably with its eastern neighbors
in this regard. Even though Russian towns also grew by leaps and bounds, the great majority
of the many hundred thousand inhabitants of Moscow were forcibly transferred serfs
constituting a crude Iabor force in the service of capital and autocracy. However petty and
feudal-corporatist Hungarian towns may have been, their administration and judicial
172 History and Society 2
system-and even their bistorical inertia-gave them, at the dawn of capitalist transformation,
a certain foundation; they bad, at least, a potential for professionalism-for a new urbanism.
*
For the peasantry, tbe so-called urbarial reforms of Maria Theresa established the principle
that tbe jobbagy-tenants‘ dues could not be bigber tban tbe values of landuse and otber
facilities offered them by tbe landowners. In 1781 Joseph legally abolished formal serfdom,
that is, tbe peasants‘ personal bondage to tbeir Iords. This should have implied that tbe
relationship between Iord and tenant was more impersonal and contractual than anywhere
eise in Europe under the ancien regime. Moreover, Hungarian tenants‘ plots were Iarger
than those of their western European fellows. For example, in Hungary every serf held on
the average 2/5 „virgates“ comprising 7-16 hold (4-9 ha) in arable land alone, while in
Germany the average was a quarter virgate (Hufe). Fields and meadows of Hungarian
villages were also wider and more open than tbose in tbe western countries.
However, westem European peasantry was characterized, not so much by the contractual
relationship between tenant and Iord, as by the complex integration of peasant activities
witbin the landowning society. The land may have belonged to the Iord, but he could do
little witb it, for it was thoroughly enmeshed in the life and work of tbe tenant peasant.
Most peasant tenancies were, in fact, historically developed family farms. The stronger the
hold of tradition, tbe more deeply and indelibly elaborated were all facets of peasant
existence. The contractual farmer is moti vated by pro fit; e jobbdgy-tenant conquers the
land, forms every sod, makes every blade of grass and every tree bis home. He is guided,
not by end-rationality, but by socialized, deep expertise informed by his bond to soil and
village.
Hungarian peasantry was less of a historically developed entity; rural life was less deeply
regulated by ancient tradition, the Iandscape less thoroughly permeated by expert cultivation.
Hence, tbe tenancy was less resistantto the demands of lordship. In tbe early eighteentb
century, when tbe state began to insist, for taxation purposes, on tbe survival of tenant plots,
tbe Iords, in turn, took advantage of the unclear, „soft“ boundaries of tenant land to
aggrandize tbeir own claims.
Maria Theresa‘ s reforms defined the size of tenant holdings, according to the quality of
tbe soil. They were still sizable, comprising some forty hold ( =23 ha) including the use of
comrnons, with additional rights to pannage and berbage. Half-, quarter-, and even
eightb-virgate holdings were still viable farms, witb cornmons‘ rights calculated for family
size and farming needs. Peasants with less than 118th of a traditional plot counted not as
tenants but as inquilini (landless peasants) who bad to work as hired hands to rnake a living.
There were also true cottars, with no land or house, „living on another’s fare.“ They, too,
had a defined place in rural society, with customary claim to employment, limited rights
to common pasture, and traditional roles in carting and crafts. Tenants and cottars together
constituted the traditional, „urbarial“ peasantry.
Hajnal: From Estates to Oasses 173
A Hungarian Peasant
174 History and Society 2
The queen’s refonns seem to have ignored a great number of unwritten, customary
remnants of centuries-old rural life. One of these, the problern of „residual land“ and assarts,
the dues for which were not clearly defined, remained moot for many decades. However,
there were innumerable other organically grown ties between landowners and those various
kinds of peasants who Ii ved in remote hamlets, or who worked land in customary tenancies
of diverse types-as sharecroppers, subtenants, laborers or farmhands. These people,
marginal to the traditional network of rural society, had been unable to root themselves,
their lives and work, in their native environment-and their land feil back into the hands of
the landowners. Of course, not all customary relationships vanished: there were still
traditional, familial bonds between estate and farmhands. These sometimes developed into
a recognized status, like that of traditionaljobbdgy-tenants. Such ties often made it possible
for peasants to retain their plots even outside the refonn‘ s framework.
On the other band, the refonn did not guarantee the holdings of long-standing tenants,
either. Under the guise of „regulation,“ landowners were allowed to rearrange peasant plots
and exchange them for domain land of „equal value.“ Many an adroit steward took
advantage of this, arguing for greater efficiency. Peasant land decreased steadily during the
nineteenth century: in 1828 the average tenant holding was only one-third virgate; land in
peasant hands totalled some five million hold (=2.875 million ha), while that of the nobles
amounted to almost ten million (=5.75 million ba). Around 1800 less than half of the
peasantry (i.e. 45%) were Iand-holding tenants of some kind; some 20% were landless and
close to 6% „houseless“ cottars. The most characteristic feature of the age was the
increasing number of rural laborers and servile fannhands. Of the 1,257,000 rural families
in the country, almost half a million were workers on the great estates-their majority Iiving
in stable-like primitive huts, working monotonaus tasks on far-away Iands, and at best
dreaming of what seemed to them lhe colorful society of the villages (if they ever got to
visit one).
The Ievel of servile dues was also maxirnized by Maria Theresa’s refonns. Western
European peasantries owed as much customary boon-work as the seignorial maintenance
of their lord’s court demanded, and by early modern times this was usually redeemed for
money. If any Iabor dues remained lhey did not exceed the typical medieval twelve days a
year. The facther east we go, the more strongly does interest override tradition, and the
more robota work is demanded. In Hungary, the urbarial rules prescribed fifty-two days
per annum. This meant that a tenant holding a full plot owed a day’s Iabor weekly, with
horse and man; half- and quarter-virgaters owed less, but even the landless cottars gave
twelve days of personal service per year. Additionally, there were many minor burdens,
including carting and supplying post-horses. These demands actually increased around
1800. Requirements for robota wort were Iower as late as the seventeenth century, but, as
they put it in the early nineteenth, „agriculture developed much since … „-thus justifying the
demands for more work from the peasantry.
Hajnal: From Estates to Dasses 175
While Maria Theresa had curtailed some of the worst abuses suffered by the peasantry,
her reforms, on the other hand, rnade coerced Iaborpart of a business deal, thus transforming
the peasantry’s customary service into calculable Iabor. Subsequently, Joseph U aJlowed
free transfer for the jobbdgy-tenant-but who would leave an ancient family plot for insecure
„freedom?“ True, the Iords had lost their right to interfere in their tenants‘ marriages and
to determine the futures of their children, nor -in principle-<:ould they arbitrarily order them
around for personal service. In reality, however, work cannot be defmed so precisely, and
t.hus the borderline between admissible Iabor and personal service remained blw:red. While
day-laborers and farmhands were theoreticaJly hired on a free rnarket, without robota
duties, in fact their dependence on the Iaudowners was virtually unlimited. Thus we can
see t.hat real rural poverty originated, not in feudal tradition, but in business-oriented
rationaJity.
The old feudal seignorial rights and jurisdictions were easily transformed into tools for
the Iandowners‘ interest against the unstructured, „soft“ peasantry. The socially complex
but disorganized villages lacked the solidarity to stand united against the Iords in mauers
involving equitable procedure. Nevertheless, Hungarian nobles-though they did not shy
back from corporal punishment-still felt restrained by social tradition. In t.his they centrast
witll tlle Prussian junkers, who ruthlessly transformed t.heir leibeigen servile tenants into
capitalistically exploited laborers and even sold tllem like slaves (as Polish and Russian
Iords did as weil). Actually, this conservatism on tlle part of Hungarian landowners,
combined with their entrepreneurial inertia, contributed to tlle sluggishness of tlle capitalist
transformation of tlle landed estates and tlleir inefficient use of coerced Iabor. Corpora!
punishment actually was reintroduced in order to alleviate the monetary burdens of the
peasantry. Many a noble sincerely believed that abolition of urbarial lies would retum
peasants to the uncivilized past andeven bring about the loss of their land. Even enlightened
noble writers, like Ferenc Kazinczy and Daniel Berzsenyi, Ieading literali of tlle early
nineteenth century, argued against the nolion of „Oppression of the peasantry.“
In feudal-sutndisch society, it is not Iands and liberty that defmes the rote of peasants.
Western peasants differed from each other not merely in the number of haystacks in their
courtyards or of bacons in t.heir pantries: even in the same village, tenants of several
historically developed types lived side-by-side, with innumerable traditionaJ names, positions
and acti vities. Each of them bad a place and task in t.he historicaJly grown rural society.
Village life was not merely a monotonous struggle for the harvest, but a mosaic of elaborate
activilies and skills. Even the smallholder’s farm was well-equipped, and his life approached
civil existence with many professional lies connecting his work to that of otllers. The
peasantry was organically connected to other strata of society and not stuck in its own
limited world. Thu‘ s, Western observers were appalled by the monotony of Hungarian
peasant life-and not only that of the poorest laborers, whose living conditions resembled
tllose in Russia and Romania. While Hungarian peasants were not barred legally from
upward social mobility (and many achieved higher positions through clericaJ and teaching
176 History and Society 2
careers), there was no natural selection for practical trades–crafts and peasantry remained
worlds apart.
In the reform movements for rural emancipation during this period we can observe not
only principles and great words, but also careful attempts to retain traditional institulians
within a new social framework. Between 1790 and the 1830s extensive discussions about
rural emancipation took place in parliamentary committees, but only a few minor laws were
passed conceming tbe legal status, the free movement, and the dues of serfs. Basic reforms
were still wanting; as in most of post-Napoleonic Europe (until 1848) tbe practice was to
register dues and record cadasters witbout Iiquidation serfdom. Thus, Hungary was not
conspicuously backward in this respect. From ca. 1830 onwards, it became clear that tbe
existing system had no future, and the diet of 1832-36 took important, tbough not
fundamental, steps towards changing it. During those years the feudal parliament clarified
notions of seignorial dependence, re-evaluated peasant plots according to living conditions
in the given area, and issued equitable guidelines to regulate such opaque matters as tbe
use of commons and forests. It was actually the post-1849 Bach govemment tbat applied
tbese principles for tbe eventual emancipation and, in spite of their deep distaste for the
last feudal diet, accepted the social spiritof these arrangements and their capacity to provide
regulation satisfactory to all parties involved. The decades of practical implementation
rescued Hungary from severe clasbes during the actual liquidation of serfdom. As early as
1836 serfs obtained the right to sell hause and land (ancestral plot tagether with later
acquisitions), and to leave their Iord if tbey wanted. Parenthetically, a new, specific type
of property relations could have developed along these lines, granting the peasants rights
to land, but retaining some ldnd of veto for the fonner landlord, based on a prospective
buyer’s skills and suitability for cultivating tbe plot in question. However, this possibility
was not realized. The same Iaw forbade tbe amassing of several servile plots and the
purchase of peasant land by Iandowners or communities. „Eternal“ redemption of servile
dues was also permitted, although serfs were not yet completely emancipated from
seignorial ties. Patrimonial jurisdiction was also adjusted to tbe usual pattem of western
feudalism, replacing the Iord by county judges and magistrates on tbe Iocal bench. Althougb
in minor matters tbe landowners retained juridical and disciplinary powers, tbeir procedures
were regulated. Serfs were also granted tbe right to litigate with a nobleman; earlier this
bad been the privilege of their Iord, who migbt easily refuse to quarre! with a neighbor or
relative „for a lowly peasant’s sake.“ The diet of 1839-40 then proceeded to allow the
complete „eternal redemption“ of service bonds-but only by mutual agreement, which
meant little in practice. In 1843-44legislation was. passed providing for the eligibility of
non-nobles to own land and hold public office. Nevertheless, in spite of these reforms, tbe
majority of the population still lived in servitude of one kind or another.
In 1848 seignorial (feudal) dues were generally abolished, and tbe efficient bureaucracy
of the post-revolutionary decade completed tbis great transition. Subsequently, the land
held by peasants was unequivocally theirs, together with Iands held in tenure arrangements
Hajnal: From Estates to Gasses 177
similar to the usual „urbarial“ ones. All in all, feudal customary rights carried the day against
rational property relations just as Stephen Werb6czy, author of the great collection of
custormary law in 1514, advocated it for the nobility in the sixteenth century. Residual
Iands, assarts, meadows and the like were di vided according to „age-Iong usage,“ based on
the „usual“ degree of peasant Iabor in these kinds of possessions. The division of commons
followed the 1836 principles, but included only „traditional“ peasants, tenants and customary
cottars. The fate of various types of dependent peasants, share-croppers, and laborers
was decided also by customary rights: families could retain, with the usual dues, plots held
in their possession since the reforms of Maria Theresa (or for a similarly Iong period of
time); other seignorial lands were merely regarded as rented, and could by recalled by the
Iord any time. In fact, most of these eventually fell into peasant hands, and finally in 1896
the law granted them property rights to land acquired earlier than 1848. However, for all
these residual Iands and various other types of property, the peasants had to pay redemption
to the Iandlord amounting, not to the full value of the land, but to twenty-times the annual
servile dues. Tbe state paid for redemption of customary plots out of extraordinary taxes,
theoretically calculating payments on the same basis, that is, twenty times the annual
revenue. However, estimates of the services value were rather low; hence, the payment for
a plot. according to the quality of the land, was generally 300-700 florins, hardly more than
two-three year’s income. Cottars were redeemed for 50 florins-and for the houseless
cottars, who bad worked for them 12 days a year, the Iords received nothing.
True, decisive bureaucratism was necessary in order to liquidate feudal conditions in all
their ramifications. The state always took legal precedents into consideration-inquiring,
for example, whether a lord’s right to keep a tavem, run a mill, claimfishing privileges,
and so on, was based on feudal law, royal grant. or acquisition of some other sort. For, if
these rights had been purchased, the owner could retain them and bis tenants bad no
recourse. Finally, it became clear that at issue were not merely rights but organic historical-
social complexes. The aim was to replace these by quantifiable, calculable conditions
which, it was hoped, would be to the advantage of both sides.
The granting band was generous, yet still the peasantry did not emerge as a winner: only
550,000 former customary tenants became freeholders, and four-fifths of these obtained
less than half a virgate. Later some seignorial land came to those who were able purchase
and redeem it for money. Houseless cottars received nothing, nor did laborers and field
hands. Some 70% of all arable land proved to be seignorial (including state and cburch
estates) and, even ifthe poor nobles‘ virtually peasant property is counted in this percentage,
the latifundia were enormous-overwhelming-and were now unencumbered „cold“ property,
entailing no social responsibility.
And the peasants, avoiding the „philanthropic“ bureaucrats of the Bach-regime, went to
their old masters with their problems. The written and printed instructions of the central
govemment were discarded by the ton in the attics of city halls. When, in the 1860s, the
system feil, the new road- and field-signs were immediately tom down. The impersonal
178 History and Society 2
bureaucratic world seemed to be over. For tbe rest of t.he century Hungarian politics was
dominated by tbe old better-off class of tbe nobility. More tban half tbe deputies in tbe ftrst
goveming party of Kaiman Tisza (Prime Minister from 1875 to 1 890) were former county
magistrates, and few non-nobles sat in tbe Lower House before 1900. Altbough tbe ftrst
commoner, Sandor Wekerle, became minister in 1889, non-nobles were unusual in Hungarian
govemment before the 1910s.
The county remained its old self. At the turn of tbe century the countryside was dominated
by tbe landed gentry, a somewhat wider circle tllan tbe old noble corporation. Some 4000
landowners held estates of one-to-ten tbousand hold (ca. 600-6000 ha) They were followed
by the „quarter-magnates,“ who owned much less but aped the gentry’s Iifestyle, as did
many professionals in the countryside as weil. B ut Hungary produced no stubbom capitalist
agrarian entrepreneurs, no equivalent of the English country gentleman or tbe Prussian
Junker. Although agriculture had very good chances after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise
of 1867 (especially witb the abolition of custom barriers to Austria, and the agrarians‘
control of politics), nevertheless the landowners feil into debt-in spite of tbe fact tbat tbeir
„gentry-world“ was truly liberal, prepared to embrace rutbless capitalism and unable to
avoid the epidemics and scandals of speculation so typical of the 1870s.
The fault was not in the persons. There was quite a Iot of goodwill, experimentation, care
and concern. The fault was in tbe social system itself and the insecure leadership it
produced. „Work and intelligence“ was the motto, calling for reorganization along tbe lines
of professionalism instead of tbe disintegrated old order. B ut professionalism was imagined
in a peculiar way-as tbougb it were an open sesame, with high technology waiting to be
pul on like an overcoat. Landowners mused over Iack of capital, wage demands, overprotection,
customs policies, and otber abstractly formulated problems-but failed to Iook at
the real Situation, at their own agricultural society, to contemplate what they could actually
do without capital and other powers beyond. Now, it is true that the villagers and field hands
did not present much promise for any such agricultural development. They lacked refined
skills-for such skills are quickly blunted within the nature-bound life of agriculture. Thus,
the gentry despaired and left it to the horsetraders and Jewish grain merchants to organize
tbe market.
In other walks oflife, professionalism was equally remote from tbe soil. Teachers, doctors
and. engineers disdained to apply their expertise to immediate, local problems, and found
it demeaning to live in the country. Their self esteem, in fact. was based not on expertise,
but on „qualifications.“ Their rootlessness thus moved them to seek jobs in civil-service.
Ironically, these professionals-by definition liberal-rational in orientation-found their
identity inan irrationally defined community: thatof“gentlemen.“ The various professions,
moreover, kept to themselves. After graduation the „experts“ lost interest in their former
teachers and schools. Local civil service was like a moated castle, financial administration
a topic non comme il faut. The busy activity of the doctor, surveyor or engineer was
interesting essentially because they made good money. The crude snobbishness of these
Hajnal: From Estates to Classes 179
specializations also tore apart the familiarity of small-town life. Tbe better society of
university graduates kept strictly apart from the high scbool absolvents, trained notaries or
even less scbooled persons beneath them. Tbe more a profession dealt with the common
folk, the lower was its value in society.
Navvies at Work
180 History and Society 2
Specialization is, of course, a fact of modern life and has many aspects in western
societies. In the West, however, not even the most esoteric specialist keeps apart from his
fellow university graduate as did these Hungarian professionals. Although, in the West,
too, natural, organic relations between persons are tragically replaced for vocations, the
past is nevertheless still at work-no activity becomes profession without the careful study
of a multitude of interrelated social problems. Some of the esoteric specializations may
seem ridiculously petty in comparison to Hungarian vocations-and yet, there is more life
in them. That is why in the West the theoretical and applied, civil and private, aspects of
professional life are much more closely connected.
In the West, when the behemoths of economic enterprise absorb the craftsmen’s worksbops,
they have to at least match, with more efficient means, the fine varieties of the old
handicrafts and stable social roles of the small businesses. While ever greater nurnbers of
people are forced into wage Iabor, capital must ever engage new strata of skilled men and
women in order to expand its empire. In Hungary, on the other band, capital is much farther
removed from economic Iife; it floats around Iike a cloud, descending here and there where
quick profit is to be gained by emde calculation. For the crafts bave no reliable, upward
mobile organizations. and the peasants are unaccustomed to quality work. For example,
French manufacturers still utilize spinning and weaving cottage industries, while in
Hungary these forms of production vanished by 1860, as soon as the first factories appeared.
Factories were founded with great speed: 114 between 1 860-1865; 280 between 1865-
1 870, and 287 between 1 870 and 1875. Although hundreds of enterprises folded after 1870
in the wake of the European crisis, nevertheless, in 1888 Hungarian factories with over
twenty employees numbered close to one thousand. The nurober of factory workers,
including women and children, rose from 90,000 in 1888, to 243,000 in 1900, and to
450,000 in 1909. Hungary’s industrially active population (including the crafts) was 2.6
rnillion in 1890 and 3.5 million ten years later; and this increase was almost entirely in
wage Iabor. A relatively high number ofHungarian factories were built in minority regions,
where the peasantry was even more uprooted than in Magyar counties. In contrast, between
1890 and 1900, 40.3% of the workers in the old French industry, supplying world markets,
were still employed in small workshops of Iess than four persons.
Thus, here in Hungary the working class was not a true social organism, but simply a
Iabor pool. For a long time skilled workers came from abroad; workers‘ joumals appeared
in Gennan. Working -class movements focussed on masses, not on quality. while in western
Europe they were based on trade unions, replacing the old guild solidarities. In France, the
trade unions never fully merged with the socialist political movement, and in England the
unions produced the Labor Party, without a strict political ideology. In Germany, however,
unions were eventually dominated by Social Democracy. Hungarian workers‘ associations
began, in the 1870s, as guild-like (and slightly anti-Semitic), economic and cultural
self-help organizations. Soon, however, they were heavily involved in the suffrage movement,
and eventually were dominated by the ideology of class struggle. After the German
Hajnal: From Estates to Dasses 181
anti-Socialist laws were repealed, U1e party began to organize in Hungary. Its membership
grew to 1 30,000 between 1 890 and 1909, with a leadership to a great extent Jewish. At frrst
Hungarian society paid little attention, and became aware of tbe movement‘ s world-historical
importance only when tbe Social DemocralS became tbe largest party in tbe German
Reichstag. Altbough outside of parliamem, Hungarian Social Democrats were active and
vocal: in 1905 tbere were 620 meetings in B udapest alone; in 1906 588 strikes took place.
Resteielive legislation, following foreign examples, did not reduce tbe Ievel of conflict.
Never, under tbe old regime, bad Hungary experienced such tension between social strata.
Due to tbe lopsided, rootless character of Hungarian professionalism, entire social classes
were restricted to activities stifling any human talent-and tbis is more important in tbe Jives
of tbe workers tban tbeir poverty. This self-interested professionalism drew tbe Jews,
previously a foreign element in society, to leadership. When tbe Hungarian intelligentsia
began to move toward praclical economic occupations, it was essenlially tbe higher income
that attracted tbem, not vocalion or tbe development of expertise.
Agrarian sociei.y cannot be understood by merely adding up stalistics. We know, for
example, tbat in 1870 only one tbird of the land belonged to peasant economies (that is, to
farms of less than 30 hold, or 17.25 ha), while 38% pertained to latifundia of over one
thousand hold (=575 ha). Oftbese lalifundia, 231 estates comprised more tban ten thousand
hold, a figure far above tbe average European agrarian enterprise. However, tbese depressing
statistics are mitigated somewhat by tbe fact tbat many !arge estates were state or
church properlies and forests. In comparison, one quarter of tbe land in tbe German Empire
was owned by latifundia of over 500 ha (in Prussia, of course, tbe figures were much
higher), and in England, 5400 great landowners controlled over half tbe arable land. While
we may be horrified by Hungarian statistics (tbat is, by tbe fact tbat, out of 2.4 rnillion
estates, 1 . 3 million were minute plots below 5 hold, or 3 ha), we tend to forget that in
France-the country of healtby peasant fanning-2 of tbe 5 million estates were, in 1905,
smaller tban one hectare, comprising merely 2.2% of arable land. Such figures make sense
only when examined witbin tbe overall context of society. English !arge estates destroyed
tbe peasantry, but only step by step, while the rural folk became part of tbe world-conquering
manufacturing industry. In France, tbe sizable properlies cannot be counted as real
latifundia, for most of tbeir territory is rented out, and tbe smallholders as weil as the
relatively few (some 600,000) landless laborers have plenty of regular employment on
neighboring farms. This system of rental and secure employment grew up historically; it
reflects, not conservatism, but age-old relations within tbe agrarian economy. Natural
resources are experUy busbanded in all tbeir aspects-and tbis makes it impossible to
evaluate agrarian economy merely in terms of pro fit. In some cases tbe rental arrangement
is almost feudal; tbe peasant provides specific produce and minor services, which are
reciprocated by aid and counsel from tbe landowner. Customary rights prohibit the
expulsion of a peasant tenant from bis farm. Similar conditions prevail in nortbem Italy,
with tbe traditional rental of small plots on large estates supported by horlicultural expertise.
182 History and Society 2
As we have seen, peasant labor farther east in Europe was unable in feudal tirnes to
develop agricultural expertise and to exploit the land efficiently. Consequently, once off
the family farm, the peasantry failed to change to modern conditions as well. Around 1 870,
there were in Hungary about 2 million propertied households, 1.65 million „annual
laborers,“ 1.3 7 hired hands; together these represent at least 10 million people out of the
total population of 15.5 million. Hence, only 40% of the agrarian population lived on its
own land, 60% on that of others. According to other calculations for the late nineteenth
century, farm-hands counted some 1.2 million, and the number of day-laborers grew to
something like 4.8 million, but this figure probably counts many smallholders as laborers.
A 1908 census of adult males registered 3.2 million in agrarian occupations, amounting to
some 1 1 million persons out of a national total of 18 million. Of these, close to a million
were landless, a third of whom lived in his own or bis family’s house. Another 850,000
owned 2-5 hoUJ (=1-3 ha). These two groups may be counted as agrarian proletariat
amounting to almost 2 million adult males, i.e., more than 6 million persons. Another
850,000 men fell into the category of peasant farmers with 5-20 hoUJ (3-11 ha);these were
the successors of former full tenants and customary cottars. The !arger property holders (up
to the Ievel of magnate) amounted to 200,000 males. These are sad figures in themselvesbut
more significant is the fact that Hungary’s agrarian society lacked organic solidarity;
it was not made up of interconnected elements, securing work and demanding skill from
one another. Afteremancipation, the peasantry began to encroach upon the latifundia. Some
of the wealthier peasants worked fanatically to acquire additional land, toiling and eating
with their field-hands. Some of them managed-almos incredibly-to acquire 1 00 hoUJ or
more, and it was even said that some farmers becarne highwaymen at night to obtain money
to purchase more land. Nevertheless, even these occasional successes Iasted no more than
a generation. The economies were not weil enough organized to keep their employees; no
mixed husbandry, exploiting a variety ofnatural resources, developed in place of extensive
grain monoculture. Thus the peasant farms did not develop into enterprises that could
compete with the great landowners, nor did they change into rentat farms or make skilled
agrarian workers out of poor day laborers. It was not will or work, but historical roots that
were lacking. The successful latifunclia were based on the cheap Iabor of cse/ed-families,
settled farmhands who were easily satisfied once their families‘ survival was more or Iess
secure. For seasonal work, day-laborers (somnuis) were brought from distaut regions.
Meanwhile, in the huge villages of the Hungarian Plain, Iaborcrs hung around on the
squares, waiting for hire, when no additional hands were needed, or when even eheaper
Iabor was imported from Slovak or Rumanian villages. Hatred against the „gentlemen“ (in
general, all ownsfolk, „men in pantallons“) grew, and by the 1890s the first agrarian
socialist movements arose.
In general, village life was probably duller than in feudal times. Previously, the distribution
offields, discussions aboutcrop rotation, division of commons and their use, reciprocal
help in construction and other communal projects regularly challenged the villagers to make
Hajnal: From Estates to Oasses 183
infonned, collective decisions. Now, everytlling was calculated in tenns of money. Horne
industries survived only as folkloric exotica. Although the educational level and standard
of living may have risen, what little Illere was in tlle way of intemal structure, further
declined. The true „creative power and spirit of the people“ does not lie in some mystical
psychology, but in tlleir adjustment to the natural environment in various different ways.
Every facet of tllis adjustment sheds light on the etemal relationship between human
existence and nature. The American fanner is no peasant, for bis enterprise is monocultural
and he secures bis needs, food included, in tlle store. The peasant remains a peasant as long
as bis workplace is also bis home and bis Iabor contains something of tlle joy of creation.
The question is, of course, whether one can decide by intelligent reasoning which reforms
truly serve society. Does one need to consider history for this? Is it not history tllat gives
weight to tlle imponderable, tlle minute and tlle incomprehensible detail in cantrast to
merely end-oriented rationality? In the final analysis, history may prove that true professionalism
lies not in utilitarian calculation but in the social appreciation of human endeavors.
Note
1. Magyar M«velodestönenet [Cultural History of Hungary], ed. S. Domanovszky et al.
Budapest: Egyetemi Nyomda,n.d.[1942],vol.5, p.165-200. Even though it is a fine summary of
Hajnal’s concept on social development-in which „expert professionalism“ playes a central part, not
unconnected to his studies on writing and literacy in the Middle Ages-the synthetising character of
the article did not allow the addition ofreferences. To augment the text by these would have amounted
to a bibliography of nineteenth-century social history (and several related topics), for which the editors
had neither time nor staff.
HISTORY & SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
2
MEDIUM .tEVUM QUOTIDIANUM
29
Nobilities in Central and Eastern
Europe:
Kinship, Property and Privilege
edited by
Janos M. Bak
Hajnal Istvan Alapltvany
Budapest
Medium IEvum Quotidianum
Gesellschaft
Krems
1994
PRINTED IN HUNGARY
Neotipp Bt., Budapest
HISTORY & SOCIETY
IN CENTRAL EUROPE
together wi th
Medium tEvum Quotidianum
EL 1E BTK GazdasAg- es
TID-sadalomtörteneti Tanszek
Budapest 1051, V. ker. Piarista köz 1 .
Hungary
MEDIDM .tEVUM QUOTIDIANUM
GESELLSCHAFf
Körnermarkt 13, A-3500 Krems
Austria
Tel.: (36)-( 1 ) – 1 1 -80-966/325 Tel.: (34-2732) 84793
Contents
Josef Zemlicka
Origins of Noble Landed Property in Pfemyslide Bohemia 7
Eiemir Mtilyusz
Hungarian Nobles of Medieval Transylvania (1986) 25
Erik Fügedi
Kinship and Privilege (1990) 55
Kiril Petkov
Boyars and Royal Officers 77
Jan Pakulski
The Development of Clan Names in Mediaval Poland 85
Karin J. MacHardy
Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion in Early Modem Austria 97
Istvan M. Szijart6
Relatives and Miles 1 4 1
Istvan Hajnal
From Estates to Classes 1 63
Authors of the volume:
Erik Fügedi (1916-1992)
Istvm Hajnal ( 1892-1956)
Elemr Myusz (1898-1989)
Karin J. MacHardy (Dept. of History, Univ. of Waterloo, Ont. N2L 3Gl, Canada)
Jan Palculski (lnst. Historii Arhivistyki, Copemicus-Univ., Plac Teatralny 2/a
PL 87-100 Torun, Poland)
Kiril Petkov (Univ. Veliko Tmovo, Ivailo I I, 4300 Karlovo, Bulgaria)
Istvm M. Szijart6 (Gazdasag- s Tarsadalomtörtneti Tanszek, EL TE,
1 15 1 Piarista köz 1 . , Budapest, Hungary)
Josef Zemlicka (lnst. of Hist., Academy of Sc. of the Czecb Rep., VisehradSka 49.,
12826 Praha 2, Czech Republic)
LECTORI SALUTEM!
The aim of the editors and publishers of this series of occasional papers is to present recent
results of research in social history to the international public. In lhe spirit ofthe Hungarian
historian of Europe, Istv:ID Hajnal ( 1892-1956), we believe lhat the history of „srnall
nations“ may highlight aspects of generat development that are less visible in the life of
major civilisations.
The volumes in this series will address specific aspects of social development in medieval
and modern central Europe. We intend to focus on the region between the German Iands
and the Byzantine-Russian world, an explore similarities and differences in this area.
Instead of arguing the validity of lhe term, we shall publish studies lhat may enable our
readers to decide to wbat extent is „central Europe“ a historical reality or merely a drearn
of intellectuals and politicians. That is why we chose a medieval map for our cover: it
emphasizes the centuries-old connecting function of the great rivers but contains no
ephemeral political boundaries.
It is also our hope to contribute to the understanding of present developments and
upheavals in a region about which few critical analyses are available in lhe English-speaking
world. At lhe same time we should like to foster modern melhods and approaches in
social history, for so long neglected in our countries.
The present volume appears in close coopcration with lhe Medium Aevum Quotidian um
Society and contains studies mainly on medieval and early modern nobilities of the region.
The papers of two recently deceased Hungarian medievalists as weil as articles of a Czech,
a Polish and a Bulgarian historian discuss the social history medi(‚val nobilities. Two
articles, on Hungarian and Austrian nobles of the ancien regime Iook at social mobility and
estate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The volume closes witb an essay by
Istvan Hajnal on the end of the noble-corporatist world in nineteenth-century Hungary.
Wilh publishing three articles of the generations preceding ours, we wish to bow tho those
who taught us, without wanting to hide lhat lhcir questions and answers are not necessarily
ours. By printing papers of youngcr scholars, in turn, we hope to present recent research in
the area on topics lhat are discussed among social historian everywherc.
The volume editor wishcs to express his gratitude to those friends and colleagues who
assisted in lhe – often almost unsonnountable – task of translating and editing lhe Czec ,
Magyar and Polish contributions: Calherine Allen, Sirnon Came, Tamas Domahidy, Vera
Galhy, Ryszard Grzezik, and Paul Knoll. Needless to say lhat he alone feels responsible
for the remaining shortcomings, which are, probably, many. Maybe, we shall publish once
a volume only on the intricacies and pitfalls of translating medieval and medievalist texts.
H & S
is a series of occasional papers published by the IstvAn Hajnal Society of Historians, in
cooperation with the Medium JEvum Quotidianum Society (Krems, Austria), the Spolecnost
hospo Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Kulturabteilung des Amtes der Niederösterreichischen
Landesregierung
Editors:
Vera Bcskai, EL TE Btk, Budapest, Pf. 107, H-1364.
Janos M. Bak, Dept. of Medieval Studies, Central European University,
Huvösvölgyi ut 54, 1021 Budapest
Gerhard Jaritz (for MJEQ), Kömennarkt 13, A-3500 Krems
Editorial consultants:
John Bodnar (Chicago, ll..), Peter Burke (Cambridge), Josef Ehmer (Vienna), Tams
Farag6 (Miskolc), Susan Glanz (Brooklyn, NY), Monica Glettler (Munich), Heiko Haumann
(Basle), Tarn Hofer (Budapest), Gerbard Jaritz (Vienna), Charles Kecskemeti
(Paris), Beta K.Kiraly (Highland Lak.es, NJ), György Köver (Budapest), Ludolf Kuchenbuch
(Bochum), Jaroslav Lanik (Prague), Hans Medick (Göttingen), Walter Pietzsch
(Wiesbaden), Martyn C.Rady (London), Herman Rebel . (Tucson, AZ), Helga Schutz
(Berlin), JUlia Szalai (Budapest), Heide Wunder (Kassel).
Manuscripts and inquiries (including advertising) should be addressed to Andr Csite,
Managing Editor HISTORY & SOCIETY c/o: Hajnal IstvAn kör, EL1E BTK, Budapest
Pf. 107, H-1364. E-mail: csite@osiris.elte.bu
Sale: Single copies in Hungary Ft 300; abroad: $ 15.00 or DEM 20.00 Sales for North and
South America are handled by Dr Susan Glanz (1550 E 9th Ave., Brooklyn, NY 1 1230,
USA; for Hungary and all other regions by the Managing Editor.
ISBN 963-04-2014-7
Coverpage idea by György Köver
Computer setting and formatting by Gbor Kelemen
Cover design Csilla Mtrai based on the Ebsdorf Mapamundi.
© Hajnal Istvan Kör, Budapest, 1994.