Cruelty in the Political Life of the Ancient World

Cruelty in the Political Life
of the Ancient World
ANDREW LINTOTT
When some years ago, at the instigation of Arnaldo Momigliano, I researched
and wrote the chapter on cruelty in my book, Violence in Republican
Rome1, I concentrated not so much on spectacular examples of
cruelty, such as elaborate punishments and the gladiatorial games, but on
the ideology behind the use of the words saevus and crudelis- what implications
the Roman language of cruelty has about the rules and restraints
perceived by Romans when they employed physical violence on other human
beings. Two points struck me then most forcibly. The first was that
for our Roman literary sources the cruelty of an act was deterrnined not
so much by the act itself but by the character and merit of the sufferer:
hence it was thought to lie more in the destruction of dignitas through
improper humiliation than in the inßiction of physical harm. This helps
by analogy to explain the frequency with which Cicero uses the adjective
locuples (rich) for the victims of Verres‘ plundering in Sicily: it was more
horrendaus to roh the rich than the poor.2 The second important condition
for an act being labelled cruel was that it was peformed not in the
pursuit of an identifiable interest, but to satisfy emotion. This cantrast is
powerfully made in the speech opposing the execution of the Catilinarian
conspirators, which Sallust attributes to Caesar.3 It seems to have been
held that, if one advanced the community’s interests (or even one’s own)
by an act of violence against persons, this was evidence that the act was
rational and deliberate, not an expression of Iibido. For example, Marius‘
massacre at Capsa was defended as the only solution to a security problem.
4 Furthermore, persans who suffered on such occasions did at least
deserve to do so from the point of view of the agents of violence, although
1 Oxford 1968. Ch. III, pp. 35-51.
2 See Merguet’s Lexicon s. v.
3 Sall. Cat. 51.2-12; Viol. Rep. Rome 47.
4 Sall.Jug. 9 1.6-7; Viol. Rep. Rome 43-4.
9
of course claims arising from status might be advanced by the sufferers,
which made it improper for the agent to pursue his interest by such drastic
means. Among the examples I used were two similar incidents from the
naval fighting in 48 BC during the civil war between Caesar and Pompey.
In each incident one of Caesar’s ships was captured and its crew was
slaughtered to a man by the Pompeians. The first example, where the
crew included no soldiers and had disobeyed Caesar’s orders, was related
by Caesar without comment. The second ship contained new recruits, who
surrendered to Otacilius Crassus after receiving a promise that they would
be spared. Crassus‘ action was stigmatised by Caesar as a breach of religio
(the moral obligation of the promise) and as very cruel.5 Only one passion
was thought respectable by the Romans in such circumstances – the desire
for revenge, because it was thought necessary for man’s protection of
hirnself and his family.6
I thought that it would be useful in the present paper to investigate the
corresponding values of classical Greek society, to see how far the attitudes
of Romans in the late Republic and early Principate had precedents there.
One contrast emerges immediately. The Romans had a vocabulary similar
to ours on this topic. If you look in a lexicon of a major Latin author,
words meaning cruel (in Cicero and Livy mainly crudelis and its relatives,
in Tacitus mainly saevus) are common, and it is clear that, whatever the
precise content of the idea, it was an important category of thought for that
author. In Greek literature such vocabulary is far less used, whether we
look in poets or prose-writers. Hence it is not surprising that the concept
of cruelty hardly figures in the important survey of Greek popular morality
by K. J. Dover.7
It is tempting to conclude from this that the Greeks of the classical
period were less concerned with the extremes and refinements of physical
violence than the Romans. One may cite as evidence pointing in the same
direction the slow and gradual introduction of Roman gladiatorial games
to the Greek world by Antiochus IV Epiphanes.8 Whereas mass-slaughter
and execution are common enough, it may be argued, we hear little of
5 Caes. BCiv. III. 14.2-3; 28.4; Viol. Rep. Rome 46.
6 Cic. Inv. Il.65; Viol. Rep. Rome 49.
7 Greek Popular Morality in the Age of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1974). The issue
arises at pp. 200-201.
8 Livy 41.20.
10
torture and mutilation in the classical Greek world, at least as performed
by Greeks (Herodotus‘ accounts of the Persian methods are a different
matter9). I do not find this a profitable approach to discussing cruelty in
the classical Greek world for two reasons. First, any sort of quantification
is impossible, given the limited amount of our evidence. Secondly, the
presence or absence of accounts of actions, which we would term cruel, in
any particular literary source may depend to a great extent on the nature of
that source itself. References are made to the torture of slaves for judicial
purposes in a quite casual way in orators and it is exploited for comic
purposes by Aristophanes: does this mean that it was unimportant or so
common that it hardly deserved notice?10 Again, was the torture of free
men considered sufficiently abhorrent to merit highlighting by an author,
or have some striking examples been ignored by our authorities? We do
not know: we only know that some recorded examples are not treated
as something exceptional. For instance, the treatment of the Athenian
tyrannicide Aristogeiton after his capture is mentioned in a muted fashion
by Thucydides, although it is dramatised in later sources.U Again, when
Thucydides is accounting for the execution of the Athenian general Nikias
by the Syracusans after his capture in 413 BC, he comments that Nikias‘
former contacts were afraid that he would betray them under torture and
hence were in favour of his immediate death.12
A quantitative approach does not seem feasible or even desirable. It is
more useful to ask whether the Greeks had a concept of cruelty at all and,
if so, how this developed. There are obvious preliminary reservations to
be made about not using present western sensibilities as a standard. Life
was short and in many respects more brutish than ours. The Greeks were
a warlike race, dominated by the male sex and accustomed to use physical
9 E. g. Hdt. 111.18; VII.35.3; VII.39; IX.11.2. But notice the crucifixion by Greeks of
the Persian governor of Sestos- the last episode in the history (IX.120).
10 Ar. Rhet. 1377a; Antiph. 1.10; 5.32; Lys. 4.12; Isoc. 17.15; Dem. 30.35 ff.; 37.40
ff.; 45.61; 59.124; Arist. Frogs 546-8; 555; 615 ff.; D. MacDowell, The Law in Classical
Athens (London 1978) 245 ff. On the limitation de facto on using slave’s evidence under
torture, when they were merely witnesses, not suspects, see S. Todd, ‚The Purpose of
Evidence in Athenian Courts‘, in: P. Cartledge, P. Millett, S. Todd (eds.), Nomos
(Cambridge 1990) 19-38 at 33 ff.
11 Thuc. Vl.57 .4; cf. Ath. Pol. 18.4 ff. with P. J. Rho des‘ commentary; Diod. 10.17.2-3;
Justin 1!.9.2-6; Polyaenus 1.22.
12 Thuc. VII.86.4.
1 1
force to solve problems. However, with regard to the present question –
how far they had a notion of cruelty – it is enough to notice that it was
a concept of importance to Romans, whose society was equally violent, if
not more so.
Inevitably, we begin with the world of the Homeric epic. Here there
is a plethora of physical violence, often described in minute detail and
highlighted by powerful imagery.13 Moreover, this is no polis society, where
restraints are imposed by written and unwritten laws. Claims are decided
by the worth of individuals and the individual’s concern is to maintain his
own status and honour. Not surprisingly, we find little concern for acts
which may appear to us cruel. However, this is not to say that there is no
notion of cruelty. The epithet nelees, meaning pityless or relentless, is used
as much of objects (steel or a bond) and phenomena (sleep or a day) as of
people. It is frequently a neutral descriptive term. Even when it involves
a negative reaction, it may simply express fear and loathing rather than a
reproach. Nevertheless, when applied to the thumos of the Cyclops, who is
eating human flesh at the time, there does seem to be an element of moral
criticism.14 In the same sense in Iliad IX Phoenix recommends that Achilles
should control his thumos and that his heart should not be neleis, while
Ajax in a similar context uses the adjectives neleis and schetlios about
Achilles for failing to control his thumos and disregarding his comrades‘
friendship, although the latter was the basis of his outstanding honour.15
Here the harsh unforgiving nature of Achilles is treated as an excess of
emotion that should have been restrained; furthermore it is said to have
transgressed a moral code in injuring companions who had maintained
their friendship for him.
The word schetlios is a general term of reproach for thoughtless or
ruthless men, who are swayed more by passion than sense. In the Odyssey
it is applied to the Cyclops and Herakles, when they break the laws of
hospitality.16 However, for the most part it is less a term of moral reproach
than an expression of despair against unthinking harshness in behaviour,
which has led to injustice. It is also used of sufferings inflicted by the gods,
including one instance, where the speaker believes the suffering to have
13 E. g. Il. 4.275 ff.; 13.379 ff.; 14.394 ff.; 414 ff.
14 Il. 9.17; 10.443; 1 1 .484; Od. 12.37. Cyclops: Od. 9.272, 287.
15 Il. 9.496-7; 628 ff.
16 Od. 9.477-9; 21.27-8; cf. 14.83-4 on the suitors.
12
been completely deservedY Nevertheless, it may be fairly claimed that
Homeric epic contains the embryo of a notion of cruelty. It is not only that
complaints are made about the harshness of actions which lead to suffering,
but that on occasion reference is made to a standard of behaviour which has
been neglected – respect for guests, respect for friends. We may compare
this with the harsh ethical world of the shepherds of North-West Greece,
w ho were studied after the last world war by J. K. Campbell.18 There too
the honour of a man and his family is the centre of morality. Violent and
indeed criminal actions against those unconnected with the family are not
merely acceptable but praiseworthy, if these advance the prestige of the
man and his family. There are, however, some harsh actions, which elicit
disapproval – those directed against women, old men, children, the weak
and the very poor. Moreover, those who exploit their physical strength
arbitrarily and tyrannically, when no interest is at stake, are regarded as
abhorrent.19
In Hesiod schetlios is used of actions associated with insolence ( hubris)
and opposed to justice (Diki). Men are schetlios for ignoring the commands
of the gods.20 The term seems to refer only coincidentally to cruelty,
since it covers any form of injustice or moral wrong. More relevant
for Hesiod’s perception of cruelty is the fable of the hawk and the nightingale,
which follows the lament over the Age of Iron and precedes Hesiod ’s
injunction to the lords ( basilees) to respect justice.
„And now for lords who understand, 1’11 teil
A fable; once a hawk, high in the clouds
Clutched in his claws a speckled nightingale.
She, pierced by those hooked claws, cried, ‚Pity me‘.
But he made scornful answer: ‚Silly thing,
Why do you cry? Your master holds you fast,
You’ll go where I decide, although you have
A minstrel’s lovely voice, and if I choose,
I’ll have you for a meal or let you go.
17 11. 2.112; 16.203-4; 17.150; 18.13; 22.86; 24.33; Od. 3.161; 5.118; 11.474; 22.413.
18 Honour, Family and Patronage – A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a
Greek Mountain Community (Oxford 1964).
19 Pp. 263 ff., esp. 292 ff., 316 ff.
20 Works and Days 236-8, cf. 253 ff. For $Chetlio$ referring to careless folly, Theogony
488.
13
Only a fool will match hirnself against
A stronger party, for he’ll only lose
And be disgraced as well as beaten.“21
The fable told to the lords bleakly represents the insolent actions of the
powerful. Nothing is said about the hawk being itself liable to death or
subject to some superior power. Persens is merely told to listen to the
dictates of justice and not commit hubris (lines 213-4). Later Hesiod
comments that, while for fish, beasts and birds it is right to eat each
other, since they have no dike, Zeus‘ law for men is that they have justice
(lines 276-80). However, the fable is a non-human image of the Age of
Iron which exists among men. It does perhaps obliquely make the point
that in this Age there can be no special claims by anyone who is defeated
by sheer might. Justice lies in the strength of men’s hands (192) . There is
no escape from suffering (201). Thus men should not improperly exploit
their physical power. However, harsh and violent actions in support of
dike are perfectly legitimate: indeed they characterise Zeus‘ own efforts to
maintain his power, as retailed in Hesiod’s Theogony.22
The hubris of the powerful as a source of unacceptable acts of violence
is one of the themes of Solon’s poetry, where it characterises dusnomia,
the opposite of eunomia. Dusnomia is associated with the rise of tyranny.
Solon hirnself rejects the harsh violence of tyranny, which some of his supporters
expected him to employ: his own reforms are based on a mixture
of bia a.nd dike.23 Thus both in Solon hubris a.nd violence have become
political issues. It is accepted that they are part of life, as it is actually
lived. However, violence in contravention of diki is portrayed as opposed
to Zeus‘ world-order.
The explicit link ma.de by Solon between lawless violence and tyranny
is a.n important la.ndmark in the development of the ideology of cruelty.
The point is put in two ways: tyranny is wrong, because it is held to be
essentially the systematic exercise of force without justice; equally, the use
of unrestrained force is wrong, because it leads to tyranny. So fa.r the
reasoning is effectively circula.r. The man, like the critics Solon portra.ys
in fra.gments 33 and 34, who chooses the violence, ma.y also choose the
tyra.nny. The only counter-a.rgument, one that a.ppea.rs in both Solon a.nd
21 Works and Days 202-12, translated by Dorothea Wender, Penguin.
22 Theog. 490 ff; 607 ff; 820 ff.
23 Frr. 4.lines 5-31; 9; 32.2-3; 34.3 and 7-8 West.
14
Hesiod, is that such behaviour will lead to his destruction through ate and
the power of Zeus.24
An interesting adjunct to Solon’s concern for the violence of powerful
men as the embryo of tyranny is his concern for hubris on a more personal
scale, which led to its becoming an offence in Athenian law. Hubris was
understood in this context as a violent assault which damaged someone’s
time (honour), including an attack on a person’s slave. From one point of
view it was support for the traditional self-esteem enshrined in epic poetry.
More practically, it was a precaution against drunken brawls arising from
aristocratic sumposia, as Oswyn Murray has recently argued.25 However,
there also seems to have been a more precisely political purpose- to prevent
the destruction of Athenian society, with its graded statuses newly
organised by Solon, though deliberately aggressive behaviour on the part
of the wealthy and powerful.
To return to our theme, the perception of cruelty, one important development
of the archaic age is its emergence in a political context – the
exercise of power without justice. A second is the belief that unacceptable
violence may constitute a long term syndrome of behaviour, not just
an isolated aberration. The Homeric perception of the immorality of the
wilful exercise of passion continues. However, it must be admitted that
cruelty has not been defined as a specific vice: the im proper use of violence
is a general characteristic of those who spurn justice. We will find that
in fifth century literature violence as something tyrannical and violence
as the wilful exercise of passion remain major themes, while cruelty itself
appears as a specific concept.
In Herodotus tyranny is by nature violent. The Corinthian Soklees
claims that it is second to none in its injustice and murderousness. 26 In
the debate about the constitutions, staged by Herodotus among the Persian
nobles who had killed the pseudo-Smerdis, Otanes is made to argue
that tyranny corrupts the best men though the benefits it brings: from
these arise both hubris and jealousy and, the most important point, such
a tyrant overthrows traditional common decencies, rapes women and ex-
24 Solon, 13.8 ff.; Hesiod, Works and Days 212 ff.
25 0. Murray, ‚The Solonian law of Hubri3′, in: P. Cartledge et al. (eds.), Nomos
(cf. note 10), pp. 139-45 – with the preceding paper by N. Fisher, pp. 123 ff.
26 Hdt. V.92a.
15
ecutes without trial. 27 A different approach to the same theme is found
in Aeschylus‘ Eumenides – a play concerned with the control of violence
between kindred and ultimately between fellow-citizens {the Eumenides
are only given their home in Athens on condition that they keep out of the
land the bloodshed associated with civil strife28). In a central ode the chorus
extols Diki, sophrosune (self-control), moderation and health of mind,
while threatening ‚what is unruled { anarkton) or ruled by tyranny‘ and ‚insolence,
child of impiety‘ with overwhelming destruction. We can see weil
here how the evil of violence is, as it were, internalised. As on occasion in
Solon, it is treated not merely as the disregard of external constraints, but
as the result of what Aristotle would ha.ve called akrasia, the lack of selfcontrol
in the mind. 29 Violence is abhorrent, not so much because of the
unpleasant consequences it inflicts on others (the raped women, the men
executed without trial), but because it shows that the perpetrator hirnself
is ill-disciplined. It is a step towards Plato’s depiction of the tyrannical
man in Republic VIII – someone, who externally as a demagogue panders
to the worst instincts of the masses, but internally is at the same time a
prey to his own uncontrolled desires.
This repudiation of violence occurs within the context of the polis.
How far the standards implicit there could apply in a contlict between
cities, where dominance at all costs was the object, was much more problematic,
and this is illustrated in the author most consciously concerned
with our theme – Thucydides. Here we find for the first time the adjective
omos used to condemn actions, while biaios (violent) is both used
critically ab out men and as a description of certain kinds of physical suffering.
30 These appear both in authorial comments by Thucydides and in the
speeches he retails. (I should say here that, following his own explanation,
I take Thucydides‘ speeches not to be expressions of his own views, but
compositions reflecting either what people did say or might be expected
to have said).
I make no apology for recalling dassie sections of Thucydides, where
27 Hdt. III.82.2-4.
28 Eum. 858 ff.
29 Eum. 490 ff., esp. 524 ff.; 535 ff.; cf. Solon fr. 4.9 ff.; 1 1 . On the Eumenides chorus
see C. Macleod, Collected Essays (Oxford 1983) pp. 31-2.
30 omoJ – Thuc. III.36.4; 82.1; 84; biaioJ – !.40.1; III.36.6; 39.2; 82.2; VI.20.2; 54.4;
VIII.66.2; VII.82.2.
16
political cruelty is a major issue. After capturing Mytilene in 427 the
Athenians, we are told, regretted their initial decision to execute all the
adult males and enslave the women and children on the ground that his
policy was cruel ( omon) and gross ( mega). Cleon, the chief advocate of the
policy, is described as biaiotatos (most violent). He is portrayed defending
the policy in a speech before the assembly. 31 lt is interesting in view of my
earlier discussion that he begins by declaring that the Athenian empire
is a tyranny. Our immediate reaction to this may be that this is pure
cynicism. The Athenians are in the position of unjust men: so logically
they must act unjustly. However, readers of Thucydides remernher that
the same point was made in Pericles‘ last speech, but in a less bullish
and more regretful tone (Athens‘ tyranny was unjust to take but dangerous
to let go). While Pericles argued in effect that the Athenians could
not win by behaving like boy-scouts, we find Cleon boldly laying claim
to the higher ground of justice: he says he is acting in accordance with
established nomoi (laws or traditions) and sophrosune. 32 lt is the Mytileneans
who have acted unjustly by revolting, after, it is implied, suffering
no unjust violence ( biaion) from Athens. 33 Cleon insists on the necessity
of a deterrent against revolt by other allies, while denouncing any idea
that it is natural to pardon natural human error or that pity and sweet
reasonableness ( epieikeia) are appropriate for enemies. His peroration is a
dilemma for the Athenians: they must either punish the Mytileneans for
their injustice or punish themselves for their own. 34 The alternative is a
withdrawal into the cultivation of noble principle by neutralism ( ek tou
akindunou andragathizesthai) – the boy-scout approach already dismissed
by Pericles. 35
The speech which answers this, ascribed to Diodotus, is characterised,
not by any appeal to humanity, but by its sophistic subversion of Cleon’s
position. Diodotus concedes justice to Cleon but claims hirnself sophrosune,
a clear-headed and unemotional devotion to Athens‘ best interests.
There is an elaborate argument against capital punishment as a deterrent
in general and a specific plea to cultivate the goodwill of democrats in al-
31 III.36.4 and 6. Speech: 37-40.
32 37.2-4; cf. II.63.3.
33 39.1-2.
34 39.7-8; 40.1-7.
35 Il.63.3.
17
lied cities- which are interesting but irrelevant to the present paper. After
a close vote there was a change in policy: only the leading Mytilenean oligarchic
sympathisers and secessionists were executed – a little more than
a thousand of them. 36
Thus there was a reduction of brutality but one can hardly talk of
mercy and forgiveness. As for the final solution of massacring all captured
males in a captured city, this was to be applied later to Skione, recovered
after secession, and to Melos, a neutral which refused to surrender.
At Torone some adult males, both Toronean and Peloponnesian were executed,
and all the women and children enslaved, but other men were sent
as prisoners to Athens, where they were later exchanged or ransomed. 37
Thucydides‘ lack of comment about these other instances of brutality is
eloquent, but we should remernher that prisoners-of-war bad no rights in
antiquity: their only protection was that they were a bargaining-counter
for ransom and exchange. In the winter of 430/29 the Athenians even
executed Peloponnesian ambassadors sent to the Persian king, claiming
that this was a reprisal for the Spartan execution of Athenian and allied
seamen. However, the Spartans captured by the Athenians on Sphacteria
were kept as prisoners in the expectation of future exchanges after a
peace-treaty, but more immediately as a ‚human shield‘- they were to be
executed, if the Spartans invaded Attica.38
The horrors of the Peloponnesian War, like that of any other war,
make a powerful impact. More powerful still, however, is the perversion
and subversion of traditional arguments for justice and restraint in the
Mytilene debate and elsewhere. Cleon bases part of his argument on
the Mytileneans‘ deserts, but it is the argument from self-interest that
is central and ultimately determines the verdict. This is true of the debate
staged by Thucydides after the capture of the Athenian ally Plataea,
which provides an ironical contrast to the Mytilene debate. The surviving
Plataeans and Athenians were promised just treatment by the Spartans as
an inducement to surrender. What they received in fact was the question
whether they bad done any good to the Spartans in the war. In effect they
were asked to prove that they bad not been complete enemies. Thucydides
attributes to the Plataean spokesman- Sparta’s official ‚friend‘ (proxenos)
36 Speech: Ill.42-8; decision: 49-50.
37 V.32.1; 116.4; cf. V.3.2-3.
38 II.69.3-4; IV.41.1; cf. 35.5.
18
at Plataea, whose name was Lakon – a long-winded but not entirely logical
speech, which nevertheless constituted a powerful appeal to Sentiment (it is
not clear how Thucydides could have acquired a clear idea of the Plataean
pleading, since the men were executed immediately afterwards, and it is
likely that we have here a specimen of Thucydides‘ imaginative artistry).
The Plataean spokesman appeals to the Spartan reputation for noble principle
( andragathia) , the very quality which Cleon and Pericles dismissed as
an inferior alternative to the toughness required to run an empire; he also
suggests that granting mercy to the Plataeans would be sophrosune. 39 The
Theban reply is devastatingly simple: by siding with Athens and by executing
Theban prisoners earlier the Plataeans have undermined any claim
to be treated with andragathia or with pity ( oiktos).40 In this debate the
Plataeans actually suggest that brutal reprisals are immoral (something
which does not appear in the Mytilene debate), but the argument from
justice is used on the side of those seeking blood: the Plataeans do not
deserve mercy. Above all, it is the Peloponnesians‘ interests which are
paramount.
For the Mytileneans and Plataens appeals to pity, justice and morality
are portrayed by Thucydides as either inappropriate or counterproductive
for those whose lives are in danger. In the so-called Melian dialogue, recalling
the diplomatic overtures before tb.e Athenian subjection of Melos,
the Athenian spokesmen are depicted as Seeking to eliminate such considerations
from the start. The Melians have a stronger case than either of
the other two, in that they are neutrals, in spite of being Spartan colonists.
The Melians duly accept the challenge to argue from expediency, but cannot
persuade the Athenians that an attack on a neutral island will darnage
their imperial interests. When they take a stand on their pride – if it is a
matter of principle for the Athenians to hang on to their empire and suppress
secession, should not they also regard it as a disgrace not to resist?
– they are rapidly told not to compete in noble principle ( andragathia)
or be concerned with avoiding disgrace but to use sophrosune and think
of their own survival.41 Looking forward, we find similar injunctions not
39 Spartan question: III.52.4; Plataean speech: 53-59; esp. 57.1; 58.1. See Macleod,
Collected Essays, pp. 103-22 for an analysis of the debate.
40 Theban speech: III.61-7; esp. 64.4; 67.2-4.
41 V.85; 88; 100-101. Sophro3une and 3oteria (survival) continue to be themes in the
dialogue – V.105.4; 110.2; 111.2.
19
only in a later passage of Thucydides relating to the oligarchic revolution
of 411 BC but also in a speech of Lysander to the conquered Athenians,
retailed by Lysias.42 This is certainly not an argument deriving merely
from Thucydides‘ invention.
Of course it may be argued that in the Melian dialogue the argument
is not about cruelty, since the Athenians are seeking a surrender which will
make the need for brutal repression unnecessary. Nevetheless, the ultimate
issue is the justification of the application of extremes of physical force.
The dialogue is linked by its ideas to the Mytilene and Plataean debates.
We have already seen the contrast between andragathia and self-interest
and the appeals to sophrosune. We also find that an argument about the
deceptiveness of hope, which is used by Diodotus to show the uselessness
of capital punishment to the superior power as a deterrent, returns in a
compressed form to show the uselessness of taking risks to avoid servitude
for the inferior power.43
What Thucydides seems to be showing is on the one hand, that a belief
had arisen by this time in Greek civil life that restraint should be exercised
in using physical force, such that actions and men could be stigmatised
as cruel and violent, while high principle ( andragathia), reasonableness
( epieikeia), prudent self-control ( sophrosune) and even pity ( oiktos, eleos)
might be invoked against such violence. However, as a corollary, such a
belief did not survive transplantation into the arena of war and the values
which supported it were either dismissed as inexpedient or, in the case
of justice and law, enrolled in the cause of justifying the ruthless pursuit
of self-interest.44 There is nothing surprising in this or allen to our own
experience. What is interesting is that Thucydides has perceived it as an
issue. A further development stressed by Thucydides is the reaction of the
ruthlessness of war on civic life itself – the theme of his famous digression
on stasis ( civil strife).
This digression is occasioned by his account of the oligarchic revolution
and democratic counter-revolution on Corcyra in 427. The war
provided a marvellous opportunity for the protagonists of the two ideologies
within cities to propagate their own interests by calling on the
support of the leaders of the two power-blocs. Once the war had been,
42 Thuc. VIII.53.3i Lys. XII.74.
43 Thuc. Ill.45.4-6j V.l03.
44 111.39.l-6j V.l05.4 (an Athenian comment on the Spartans).
20
as it were imported into internal city politics, the sufferings that ensued
brutalised people’s mental attitudes. There was an exponential increase in
the subtlety of plotting and enormity of reprisals. The chief principle was
loyalty to faction and this overrode family feelings, the force of oaths and
human and divine law. In consequence langnage became distorted: the
conventional descriptions for certain kinds of behaviour were drastically
changed – even to their converses. Justice and the interest of the city no
Ionger provided limits to the harshness of conflicts and the fearsome acts
of revenge.45
Thucydides‘ general picture is borne out, not so much by the events
he has related at Corcyra or by other instances of stasis in the ten-year war
before the peace of Nikias in 421, as by events in Athens and Samos during
the oligarchic revolution of the Four Hundred and the counter-revolution
(411 BC). It is not appropriate here to rehearse the story I told in my book
on Greek civil strife. I would simply like to stress two points. The first is
oligarchic terrorism. Before the coups themselves, assassination was used
both to eliminate potential opponents, like the demagogues Hyperbolos
and Androkles, and to create a mood of frightened acquiescence in the
rest of the population. After the coup in Athens, only a small nurober
of democrats were killed ( described by Thucydides as ‚those suitable for
elimination‘), others being imprisoned or driven into exile.46 The second
is the propaganda aspect, which so impressed Aristotle that he thought
it was the revolutionaries‘ main weapon. The oligarchs maintained originally
that they would win the war by recalling Alkibiades from exile and
obtaining Persian money. In face of objections to their programme based
on existing Athenian law, Peisandros talked of the sophrosune of oligarchy,
which, he said, would win the Persian king’s confidence: survival was more
important than the constitution. As we have seen, this recalls the langnage
of the Melian dialogue.47 Sophrosune and its cognates seem to have been
oligarchic catchwords, indicating the political discipline that would result,
if political decisions were not left to the whim of the masses.48 Both these
developments, the readiness to kill without provocation and the ability
45 III.82-3; esp. 82.5-8.
46 VIII.65.2; 66.2-5; 73.3. Cf. Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the
Classical City (London 1982) 92-3, 135 ff.
47 Ar. Pol.V.1304b 10 ff; Thuc. VIII.53.1-3; 54.1. Cf. note 41 and the associated text.
48 Sophro􀁡v.ne: Thuc. VIII.64.5; 111.82.8; 􀁡oteria: VIII. 72.1; 86.3.
21
to furnish specious defences for this were stressed by Thucydides in his
general analysis of stasis. They are also illustrated in the orator Lysias‘
description of Theramenes after the Athenian assembly which was cowed
by Lysander into establishing the ‚Thirty Tyrants‘ in 404. „He enslaved
you twice, despising the present regime and aspiring to one out of reach,
and under the most noble of titles he became an instructor in the most
abominable actions.“49
In the great crises depicted by Thucydides we have returned to the
world of Hesiod’s Hawk and Nightingale. It is pointless to hold out against
the violence of stronger powers. The difference is that the hawk has learnt
to sing eloquently. He may declare that his imperial power makes it just
to demand subservience; he may point out that he is acting according to
a law of nature or simply claim the right to promote his own interest. At
all events submission to him is sophrosune. Indeed, if he is an oligarchic
hawk, he will claim that the inculcation of sophrosune is a central part
in his programme. Appeals to pity and reasonableness are as futile as in
Hesiod. More important, the countervailing view, which denounces such
behaviour as tyrannical and morally corrupt, has, at least for the moment,
lost its edge. The difficulty was to find an adequate intellectual foundation,
since both arguments from strict justice and from self-interest could often
be employed for the advocacy of frightfulness.
lt would not be surprising if the violence of the late fifth century, associated
both with war and strife within the cities, had made some impact
on Greek perceptions of what was cruel. And there is some evidence from
Athens to suggest that it did. We can see a reaction to the first oligarchic
revolution in the truculent mood of the assembly after the full democratic
restoration of 410 BC – best instanced in the trial of the generals in 406,
where it was actually turned against leading democrats. Moreover, there
was a series of accusations of men, of greater or lesser importance, believed
to have been implicated in oligarchic activities. In the spring of 405 Aristophanes
used the second parabasis of the Frogs to appeal for an amnesty
for those who had been exiled or had suffered diminution of citizen-rights
through association with the Four Hundred.50 After the deposition of the
Thirty Tyrants in 403 and the return of the democrats to the city of Athens
49 Lys. XII. 78.
50 Lintott, Viol. Class. City 154-5. See esp. Xen. Mem. II.9; Lys. XXV.25 ff; Arist.
Frogs 687 ff.
22
from the Peiraeus, an amnesty prevented reprisals on such a scale a second
time. Excepted from its provisions were the Thirty themselves, the succeeding
oligarchic board of ten in the city, the oligarchic board of ten in
the Peiraeus, the eleven prison-officials and all those who had committed
murder or violence with their own hands (whether during the rule of the
Thirty or immediately after the democratic restoration). It was a famous
precedent, to be cited by Cicero in the senate a few days after the !des of
March, 44 BC, though it is fair to say that it was created less by a feeling
of forgiveness than by the necessity of putting an end to strife and under
strong pressure from the Spartan king Pausanias. 51
In subsequent trials, however, charges connected with the oligarcby
were introduced to complement those which could be legitimately brought.
There was prejudice against tbe cavalry who bad served under and cooperated
witb the Thirty and a tendency to regard wealthy young men wbo
bebaved in an insolent way as crypto-oligarcbs.52 „lt would be astonisbing,
if, while you judge wortby of death tbose who have committed hubris
(violent assault) under tbe oligarchy, you allow to go unpunished tbose
who follow the same practices in a democracy. And yet it would be just
if tbe latter received a severer penalty. For tbey display their wickedness
the more blatantly. For the man wbo has the audacity to break the law
now, wben it is not permitted, what would he bave clone, wben those in
control of the city were even grateful to tbose who were committing such
crimes?“53
There is of course a continuity between the perception of hubris in
tbe time of Solon and this fourtb-century view. Wealth and aristocratic
arrogance are major causes and it is believed essential to tbe preservation
of political society tbat tbey sbould be punisbed.54 However, tbere seems
little doubt that this perception was sbarpened when the hubris in question
bad taken tbe shape of the brutality of the Four Hundred or Thirty
and was not merely associated witb the outrageous behaviour of drunken
aristocrats. Any violence committed by a certain type of man may be
51 Xen. Hell. 1!.4.38,43; Ath. Pol. 39.5-6; Andoc. 1.90-1; Lys. XII.88 ff; Isoc. XVIII.2-3;
Cic.,Phil. I.l.
52 Lintott, Viol. Class. City 176-7.
53 Isoc. XX.10-11 , cf. 4.
54 Solon fr. 1.71 ff; 4.5 ff; 9; Lys. VII.13 f; Ar. Ploutos 563 f.; Dem. XLV.37; cf. Dover,
Greek Popular Morality 1 1 0 f.
23
viewed as a symptom of oligarchic sympathies. In this way a concept of
cruelty emerges which is not merely political. as it is in Solon, Herodotus
and Aeschylus, but is specific to a particular political ideology.
We may compare two speeches of Demosthenes about assault and
physical outrage. The speech against Conon, written for a suit about
aikeia (assault), is concerned with the violence of drunken young men.
Much is made of their arrogance and their desire to humiliate the speaker
and his son; there is plenty of innuendo about the sexual predilections and
strange rites of the club (hetaireia) , to which they belonged. But there are
no political overtones.55 By contrast in the speech Demosthenes delivered
on his own account against Meidias, although he never uses the word ‚oligarch‘
– which might well have made him liable to a charge of kakegoria
( slander) hirnself – he does his best to imply that Meidias‘ character was
of this type. He argues that the normal excuse – ignorance of what one
was doing thanks to the combination of alcohol and the cover of darkness
– do not apply to Meidias.56 The truth is much worse: Meidias‘ wealth
and the influence of his hetairoi make him so insolent that he will not
recognise a poor man as a human being and he will think it right to dishonour
him and do him violence.57 The poor are portrayed as perpetually
vulnerable to violent attacks, while the insolent rich are typically those
who commit violence and then seek to spirit away complaints by bribery.
„lmagine“, says Demosthenes, „it may happen (I hope not: it won’t) that
such wealthy men should become masters of the constitution with Meidias
and men like him, and one from among you, the multitude of men of the
people (polloi kai demotikoi), should offend against one of them – not so
greatly as Meidias has against me, but in some other way – and should
enter a court filled with such men, what mercy or consideration do you
think you would obtain?“58 Demosthenes sets up as a contrast to Meidias‘
behaviour what is moderate ( metrios) and humane ( philanthropos) –
treatment which Meidias does not deserve to receive, because he does not
act in this way – and he also generally ascribes kindness (praotes) to the
Athenian demos and commends the philanthropia of the law on hubris, in
55 Dem. LIV.14-20, 38-9.
56 Dem. XXI.38, 72, 180.
57 Dem. XXI.20, 98, 101, 198,201.
58 Dem. XXI.l22, 209. Cf. Fisher (cited note 25) p. 132.
24
so far as it protects slaves from barbarous lands as well.59 His aim is to
establish an antithesis between the arrogant, lawless, oligarchic violence of
Meidias and the kindness and humanity of democratic values. Similarly
in the speech against Androtion we find, „if you wish to inquire why a
man should choose to live in a democracy, rather than an oligarchy, you
would find the most immediate response to be that everything is more
praos (kind) in a democracy.“ Again in the speech against Timokrates,
the laws about ratification and changes in established law are described
as „ordering nothing cruel ( omon) or violent ( biaion) or oligarchic, but on
the contrary giving instructions in a humane ( philanthropos) and democratic
manner.“60 The general association of oligarchy with violence and
democracy with humanity is clear. Later in the speech against Timokrates
he modifies and refines this point. Timokrates is imagined to be claiming
that it is in the interest of the weak that the laws should be humane;
Demostheues claims that on the contrary this only applies to laws about
private matters; those about public affairs should be tough and severe, so
that politicians are less likely to wrong the masses.61 It remains true that
the ethos which Demosthenes claims for Athens is that the weak should be
pitied and the strong and infiuential should not be permitted to commit
outrages.
The language of cruelty in the speeches of Demosthenes seems immeasurably
closer to our own than that of Homer or Hesiod, but it is clearly
the product of a specific society with a unique history. Nor were its values
common to all Athenians of that period. To leave aside Meidias and his
like, they are not identical with the values of Plato and Aristotle. In Plato’s
Republic the tyrannical man is portrayed in traditional terms as someone
bestial who commits outrageous acts, but the harm is perceived as darnage
to the community as a whole and to the psyche of the offender, rather than
to the victims. Indeed, if the demos suffers, it is its own fault for changing
the smoke of slavery to free men for the fire of slavery to despotism. For,
in Plato’s view, the demos has encouraged the tyrant, who has treated the
59 Dem. XXI.47-50; cf. Plut. Solon 18.5-6, with Fisher and Murray ( cited note 25)
pp. 123-4, 145.
60 Dem. XXII.51; XXIV.21. For the vocabulary cf. XXV.81-4; XIII.l7; XXIII.69-70.
61 Dem. XXIV.190-3, cf. 170-1.
25
wealthy as its enemies by cancelling debts and redistributing land and has
pretended to be affable and kind to everyone.62
Aristotle has no place for philanthropia or praotes in the Ethics. The
nearest equivalent is the condition of the epieikes philos, who occupies the
intermediate position between the obsequious man and the ill-tempered
and churlish man. Such a man is not friendly, because he has affection
for those with whom he associates, but through a trait of character. He
will be guided by the consequences of his action: he will generally prefer
to give pleasure than pain but, where it is not honourable or expedient
to give pleasure, he will give pain. (Real friendship by contrast requires
partnership and a good form of relationship, while eunoia (goodwill) is
something momentary and superficial. )63 We can see here so mething of the
civilised ethos of Athenian democracy in the fourth century, but Aristotle
is not concerned here with harsh political realities, where the rejection of
brutality is of great importance, but the creation of ideal bonds between
fellow-citizens. Nor does he face the problern of how to deal with someone
with whom you have no partnership. As for the reflections of popular
morality in Theophrastus‘ Characters, perhaps the only passage relevant
here concerns the akairos (the unseasonable, insensitive man). He is the
sort of man who, when you are flogging your slave, comes up and teils you
that one of his own hanged hirnself after such a beating.64
In conclusion, Iet me briefly compare the Greek evidence with the
Roman evidence. The association of cruelty with passion, an uncontrolled
mental state, is explicitly common to Greek and Roman ethics. The acceptability
of violent actions which are governed by expediency is, on the
other hand, not a general assumption of Greek ethics, as it appears to be
among the Romans: indeed, it is rejected by those authors for whom the
exercise of force must be subject to justice. However, this attitude may
be seen, explicitly or implicitly, in the argumentation ascribed to speakers
by Thucydides. The dassie example of this is Diodotus‘ speech in the
Mytilene debate, where Cleon’s passion and his claims to justice are both
rejected65 in favour of a course which serves best Athens‘ long-term interest.
The Peloponnesian War, in Thucydides‘ view, encouraged the use
62 Rep. IX. esp. 571b; VIII.566d–e, 569a.
63 Nic. Eth. IV.1126b 11 ff; V111.1161a. 10 ff; 1161b 11 f; 1166b 30 ff.
64 Theophr. Char. Xll.12.
65 Thuc. 111.42.1.
26
of violence in pursuit of self-interest without respect for divine or human
justice. Similarly, even if Greeks did not make such a strong connection as
Romans between cruelty and the status or deserts of the victim, we find
this sort of argument deployed by the Thebans in Thucydides‘ Plataean
debate and even in Demosthenes‘ approach to the law of Athens in the
speech against Timokrates, where philanthropia is to be reserved for the
poor and not accorded to wealthy politicians.
By the fourth century the conflict between democratic philanthropia
and oligarchic cruelty had become an issue at Athens, but, on the evidence
we possess ( and perhaps this is an important qualification), cruelty remains
a comparatively unimportant ethical category for the Greeks. It may be
that the concern of the early Stoa for a shared humanity and its abhorrence
of tyranny by one human being over another led to cruelty receiving a
high er profile in the Hellenistic world than it had earlier, w hich the Romans
inherited, but it is only fair to say that the later Stoa came to accept that
such subjection was natural, even if this did impose obligations on rulers.66
My own view is that the Roman concern for cruelty was part of their own
political culture, which was centred on the exercise of physical power and
whose grades of dignitas made them especially sensitive to violence which
produced humiliation. But that must be the subject of another paper.
66 See A. Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa. (London 1990} 43 tr, 192 tr.
27
MEDIUM AEVUM QUOTIDIANUM
HERAUSGEGEBEN VON GERHARD JARITZ
SONDERBAND II
CRUDELITAS
The Politics of Cruelty
in the Ancient and Medieval World
Proceedings of the International Conference
Turku {Finland), May 1991
Edited by
Toivo Viljamaa, Asko Timonen
and Christian Krötzl
Krems 1992
Front page illustration: Martyrdom of Saint Barbara (detail),
Friedrich Pacher, Tyrolian, 1480-1490,
Neustift (Novacella), South Tyrol (Italy), Stiftsgalerie
Alle Rechte vorbehalten
– ISBN 3-90 1094 05 9
Herausgeber: Medium Aevum Quotidianum. Gesellschaft zur Erforschung der materiellen
Kultur des Mittelalters, Körnermarkt 13, A-3500 Krems, Österreich – Druck:
KOPITU Ges. m. b. H., Wiedner Hauptstraße 8-10, A-1050 Wien.
Contents
Preface 7
Andrew LINTOTT (Oxford): Cruelty in the Political Life
of the Ancient World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Maarit KAIMIO (Helsinki): Violence in Greek Tragedy 28
Toivo VILJAMAA (Thrku): „Crudelitatis odio in crudelitatem
ruitis“ . Livy’s Concept of Life and History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Katarüna MUSTAKALLIO (Helsinki): The „crimen incesti“
of the Vestal Virgins and the Prodigious Pestilence
Asko TIMONEN (Thrku): Criticism ofDefense. The Blam-
56
ing of „Crudelitas“ in the „Historia Augusta“ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Christer BRUUN (Helsinki): Water as a Cruel Element in
the Roman World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4
Luigi de ANNA (Thrku): Elogio della crudelta. Aspetti
della violenza nel mondo antico e medievale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Greti DINKOVA-BRUUN (Helsinki): Cruelty and the Medieval
Intellectual: The Case of Peter Abelard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Christian KRÖTZL (Tampere): „Crudeliter affiicta“ . Zur
Darstellung von Gewalt und Grausamkeit in mittelalterlichen
Mirakelberichten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5
Thomas LINDKVIST (Uppsala) : The Politics of Violence
and the Transition from Viking Age to Medieval Scandinavia
Alain DUCELLIER (Toulouse): Byzance, Juge Cruel dans
un Environnement Cruel? Notes sur le „Musulman cruel“
dans l’Empire byzantin entre Vlleme et XIIlerne siedes
Asko TIMONEN (Turku): Select Bibliography
6
139
148
181
Preface
The present volume is a collection of the papers read at the conference
which was held in May 1991 at the University of Turku on the theme
The Politics of Cruelty in the A ncient and Medieval World. The general
aim of the conference was to advance interdisciplinary and international
collaboration in the fields of humanistic studies and particularly to bring
together scholars who have common interests in the study of our past.
The choice of the subject of cruelty naturally resulted from different study
projects concerning the political and social history of late antiquity and
the Middle Ages – the Roman imperial propaganda, the conß.ict between
paganism and christianity, the history of the Vandals, the Byzantine empires,
the Medieval miracle stories, to name some of them. Perhaps also
contemporary events had an influence on the idea that cruelty could be
the theme which conveniently would unite those various interests. And
the idea emerged irrespective of considerations whether or not we should
search for models in the Ancient World or join those who, as it seems to
have been a fashion, insist on investigating what we have common with
the Middle Ages.
One might argue – and for a good reason indeed – that cruelty is
a subject for anthropologists and psychologists, not for philologists and
historians. Where does the student of history find reliable criteria for
defining the notion of cruelty in order to judge the men of the past and their
actions, to charge with cruelty not only individuals but also nations and
even ages („the crudelitas imperatorum“ , „the Dark Ages“ , „the violence of
the Vikings“, „the cruel Muslims“ )? Is it not so that the only possibility is
to adapt our modern sensibilities to the past and to use our own prejudices
in making judgements about others? The prejudices – yes, but this is just
what makes the theme interesting for the historian because our prejudices
– our conception of cruelty, for instance – are part of the heritage of past
centuries. The events of our own day – maybe more clearly than ever – have
demonstrated that we live in a historical world. When we investigate the
history of the concept of cruelty we, as it were, Iook ourselves at a mirror
and learn to understand ourselves better. The concept of cruelty has two
sides. It is a subjective concept used to define and describe those persons
7
and those acts that according to the user of the term are negative, harmful,
humiliating, harsh, inhumane, primitive and unnatural; in everyday life
it is associated with religious habits – with crude remnants of primitive
religion, it is associated with passion, an uncontrolled mental state, or with
violence and with the exercise of power without justice. On the other hand
the term is used to classify people by their ethical and social habits, to
accuse, to invalidate and injure others; therefore the accusation of cruelty
refers to basic features of ancient and also Medieval thought, to the fear of
anything foreign, to the aggressive curiosity to define and subsume others
simply by their otherness.
Such were the considerations wich gave inspiration for arranging the
„cruelty“ -seminar. The conference was accommodated by the Archipelago
Institute of the University of Turku, in the island Seili („Soul island“) , in
an environment of quiet beauty of the remote island and sad memories of
the centuries when people attacked by a cruel fate, lepers or mentally ill,
were banished there from the civilized community.
The conference was organized by the Department of Classics of the
University of Turku in collaboration with the Departments of Cultural
History and Italian language and culture of the same university. It is a
pleasure to us to be able to thank here all those who helped to make the
congress possible. We would like especially to express our gratitude to
Luigi de Anna and Hannu Laaksonen for their assistance in preparing and
carrying out the practical arrangements. The financial assistance given by
the Finnish Academy and by the Turku University Foundation was also
indispensable. Finally, we close by expressing our gratitude to Gerhard
Jaritz, the editor of the Medium Aevum Quotidianum for the Gesellschaft
fü r Erforschung der materiellen Kultur des Mittelalters, for his kind COoperation
and for accepting this collection of papers to be published as a
supplement to the series of the studies on the Medieval everyday life. One
of the starting-points for organizing the „cruelty“ -conference was the firm
conviction that the Graeco-Roman Antiquity did not end with the beginning
of the Middle Ages, but these two eras form a continuum in many
respects, and the continuity was felt not only in the literary culture, in the
Greek and Latin languages which were still used, but also in the political,
social and religious structures of the Middle Ages. We think that this
continuity is amply demonstrated by the studies of the present volume.
Department of Classics, University of Turku, Finland
8