Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion in Early Modern Habsburg Austria

KARIN J. MACHARDY
Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion in Early Modern
Habsburg Austria
1
ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes changes in the social structure of the Lower Austrian nobility
in the decades before the uprising of 1618-20. The author argues that the Habsburg
rulers ex.ened considerable injluence on social change but were limited by structural
forces, notably demographic and economic change. Nevertheless, they managed
to turn events to their advantage and manipulate the transformation of the nobility ’s
internal structure in the hope of creating a pliable instrument of royal absolutism.
The Habsburgs were less interested in creating a new nobility than in reestablishing
confessional conformity, which they considered essential to strengthen their authority.
However, they implemented their strategy of promoting the rise of a new
Catholic upper nobility at a speed that minimized the possibility of appropriate
cultural adjustmentfor Protestant nobles. Their exclusion from the benefits of status
mobility after 1609 represented an attack not only on the religion, culture, and
social predominance of the Protestant nobility, but on its continued existence as an
elite. This explains, the author concludes, why redefining the rules and channels of
elite recruitment in favour of a new Catholic nobility became the focal point in the
conjlict between Habsburgs and Protestant nobles. The author further suggests that
the revolt of the nobility in the Austrian territories provides an excellent case study
to show the complexities of social change affecting the early modern European
nobility, and to reconsider the long-term social origins of early modern state
breakdown.
Since World War II the historiography of early modern elite opposition to central govemments
has been dominated by what scholars now classify as the traditional social interpretation.
During the last decade, however, a new orthodoxy has emerged which minimizes,
or even negates altogether, the long-term social causes of elite rebellion and state break98
History and Society 2
down. Thus revisionist historians of tlle English Civil War oppose the claim tllat subversive
constitutional and religious beliefs were sirnply the ideological weapons of a rising gentry
and bourgeoisie struggling against a declining feudal aristocracy and backward monarchy.
According to the revisionists, sufficiently pronounced social distinctions between members
of the top elite simply did not exist.
Z
The English landowning class, tlley maintain, was a
relatively homogenaus group who shared a wide range of interests. Furtllermore, since a
section of tlle bourgeoisie sided witll an entrepreneurial-minded crown, while leading
aristocrats, who engaged in capitalist activities, joined the parliamentarians, revisionists
prefer to interpret the Civil War in terms of short-run causes rather than as a conflict arising
from long-term changes in the social structure? They argue that the causes of tbe civil war
arose from misinformed factions, who pursued narrowly defined private interests, Charles
I’s misguided actions, t11e pressures of war, rebellion in Ireland, and subsequent fina.ncial
stress, all of which suddenly converged to open the way for disruptive divisions over
religion and politics.
Remarkably similar ideas have emerged in the historiography of tlle French Revolution.
The orthodox social interpretation clairned that it was a revolution of the bourgeoisie, who
asserted its own specific interests against a conservative, feudal aristocracy and monarchy.
4
It is safe to say that this view is now widely discredited. Since French capitalism was still
in its infancy, many nobles were relatively dynamic entrepreneurs, and the bourgeoisie was
predominantly an elite of notables, the new orthodoxy maintains that state breakdown in
France could not have been caused by long-run social factors, hinging on class conflict.
Instead, revisionists see the revolution as precipitated by accidents, such as severe weat1ler,
war, and ot11er short-tenn crises, and bJ divisions witllin tlle bureaucracy of tlle absolute
state. With sorne notable exceptions, much of current historiography on the Ancien
Regime concentrates on the history of t11e fiscal crisis and administrative institutions, or
follows Furet‘ s call for a history of political culture t11at studies the network of signs which
supposedly detennine political conflict.6
Recently, there is evidence that the revisionists are beginning to lose their hegemonic
position. A nurober of eminent social theorists and historians of Western Europe have
pointed to the difficulties of disassociating early modern rebellions and revolutions from
long-term processes of social change and ideological differences among the protagonists.
For example, in the context ofEnglish historiography, Robert Brenner has stressed that we
should resist the conclusion that the failure of the traditional social interpretation means
seventeentJ1 century conflicts were without a.ny social foundations whatsoever. Instead, he
argues, we should remember „tbat the aim of the traditional social interpretation was
initially to provide a social basis, a social logic, for what was already a broadly accepted
account of seventeentb-century conf!icts in terms of differen es over constitutional and
religious principles.“
7
If the „revolution“ was little more tllan a large-scale historical
accident, Jack Goldstone has asked, tllen how is one to explain tlle rnultiplicity of rebellions
tllroughout Europe and Asia during the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
8
AnalyMacHardy:
Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 99
zing the French revolution, Colin Jones has also pointed out that research by revisionists
themselves has actually provided new foundations from which to reconsider the long-term
social origins of revolutions?
With tbe exception of studies on the German peasant wars, these controversies have hardly
touched work on rebellions in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it is true !bat during
the past decade the historiography of the early modern Austrian territories10 has finally
taken a turn toward socio-economic history, 11 surprisingly little research has been concerned
with social unrest, ot11er than with the rebellious peasantry.12 The „Bohemian“ uprising
of 1 6 18-20 has been neglected by Austrian scholars, even though one third of the Lower
Austrian nobility participated in it. Consequently, most recent treatrnents of the revolt,13
which supposedly represents a watershed in Habsburg history, still follow t11e basic
arguments of Hans Sturmberger, 14 who viewcd it as a long-standing constitutional conflict
that was invigoratcd by the religious Reformation. This idea of a troubled constitutional
dualism between Habsburgs and estates, and the stress on the interlocking motives of
religion and politics is compatible wilh recent German work, which views „confessionalization“
as the motor of the early modern state-building process.15
Czech scholars have traditionally shown greater interest in the socio-economic causes of
tbe „Bohemian“ revolt, and since the 1950s have argued that the „conflict grew out of the
complicated economic and social Situation that prevailed in the period of transition from
feudalism to capitalism.“ 16 They placed particular emphasis on t11e inherent contradictions
within the Bohemian form of Grundherrschaft, which involved a „combination of some
capitalist elements with methods ofpurely feudal exploitation.“17 However, this view has
come under attack since the mid 1980s, and schalarship on the relations between Habsburgs
and their estates in the Bohemian Iands has tended to move away from socio-economic
intcrpretations and toward treating political and religious issues as autonomous.18 Nevertheless,
crucial questions concerning the social basis of Habsburg absolutism and elite
Opposition before 1620 have remained unanswered. For example, in order to illuminate
such important problems as the causal rote of social mobility, and of the decline of the
lcsser nobility, we still need more research on individual provinces, such as Upper and
Lower Austria. Furthermore, comparative studies which include all ofthe Habsburg Iands,
and consider the developmcnts in these territories in a broader European perspective are
essential.19
Rather than linger any Iongeron this family romance „in which a succession of Revisionist
Prince Charmin􀃔s rcscue Marianne from the clutches of a wicked, mean-spirited old
Stalinist Baron,“ 0 this paper will rcconsider the social causes of early modern elite revolts
by taking the much neglected rcbellion of 1620 in the Austrian Habsburgs territories as a
case study. Il will show that social factors did indeed play an indispensable role in the
conflicl. But instead of launehing adjeminam attacks against the new or old orthodoxy, I
will argue tllat it is nccessary to combine the structuralist arguments ofthe materialists with
t.hose of scholars adopting a political approach, and with the innovations arising from
1 00 History and Society 2
cultural perspectives. Although I will concentrate on the role which Status mobility and the
subsequent changes in the social structure of the Lower Austrian nobility played in this
revolt, I will also argue that it can be understood only as a multifaced process in which
long-terrn structural processes intertwined with various short-run contingent problems.
Using Pierre Bourdieu’s expanded definition of the concept of „capital,“ the second part
of this article will outline a theoretical framework for understanding the significance of
social status in aristocratic society. The following section will explore the conditions under
wbich social mobility could Iead to serious divisions within the nobility, and especially
between nobles and rulers. I will argue that the possibility for open conflict was present
when Status mobility brought changes in the compo􀂾ition of noble society, which led to tbe
displacement of a significant proportion of its members. In the fourth part of the article, I
will describe the actual changes in the social and religious composition of the Lower
Austrian nobility between 1580 and 1620. I will suggest that long-terrn structural changes,
such as population growth and intlation, aided the Habsburgs in their attempts to transform
the intemal structure of the noble estates. In the hope of creating a pliable instrumeilt of
royal absolutism, they promoted the rise of a new Catholic upper nobility. The resulting
displacement ofProtestantnobles underrnined their „capital,“ and Ied them to fear that their
very existence as a social elite was at stake; it was this that underpinned the revolt in 1620.
However, the uprising was not inevitable. Had the Habsburgs introduced the changes in
tbeir social recruitrnent policies less rapidly, they would have mollified the disruptive
effects of all tbe factors lying behind the contlict. The Protestant nobles could have more
easily preserved tbeir „capital“ by modifying their values and life styles, so accommodating
to the political arnbitions of the Habsburgs.
The Importance and Nature of Social and Symbolic Capital
As I will show below, it is difficult to equate the interests of the nobility with material
interest alone. Rather, the conceptofinterest must be extended to include cultural and social
dirnensions which lie outside of production. Pierre Bourdieu · s analytical framework is
illuminating in this context precisely because be enlarges upon the conventional definition
of capital as an exclusively economic resource by including non-monetary investments.
Bourdieu redefines capital as a set of actual or potential resources. or power capacities,
which agents or groups can dispose of to sustain or improve their positions in all areas of
life: economic, social, and cultural. His airn is not only to understand „capital and profits
in all their forrns,“ but also to determine how the „different types of capital (or power, which
arnounts to the same thing) change into one another.“ As Bourdieu hirnself explains:
Depending on the field in which it functions, and at the cost of more or less expensive
transforrnations which are the precondition for its efficacy in the field in question,
capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 101
fonn of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions,
into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the fonn of educational
qualifications; and as social capilal, made up of social obligations („connections“),
which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be
institutionalized in the fonn of a title of nobility.
21
Cultural capital includes cultural goods (for example, art works and books) and „Ionglasting
dispositions of the mind and body“ (for example, education and tastes). Social
capital consists of resources linked to membership in a group, understood as a durable
network of relationships maintained by material and symbolic exchanges. Like any other
fonn of capital, social capital, which is the primary focus of this paper, can be transformed
into other fonns of power.
The title of nobility is the purest fonn of social capital, as it legally guarantees the
endurance of a particular system of social relations. Noble status not only authorized
dominance over the peasantry but usually assured access to the court, so facilitating political
influence and social Connections which could be used to secure and enhance economic
capital. Noble Status was also the prerequisite for attending the assernblies of the noble
estates, which assured some influence in the affairs of the territory, especiall y over taxation,
but was also crucial for detennining the estates‘ distribution of pensions and gifts. It
appears, then, that in economies where markets were underdeveloped, the maintenance and
accumulation of economic capital became most effective when associated with social or
symbolic capital, which Iegitirnized economic power. It must be stressed, however, that
social capital is not reducible to economic resources, even though it is never entirely
independent of them. Thus, some economic capital may be essential to obtain a noble title
in the first place, which then may serve to produce or reproduce other forms of profits,
financial and non-financial. Thus, once a member of the group, a noble gained access to
collectively owned capital, such as prestige, tax exemption and other privileges, and to
networks of social connections, which could underpin the further accumulation of economic
capital.
The mechanisms of acquisition and Iransmission of cultural and social capital are less
obvious than those pertaining to economic capital, because they tend to function as
symbolic capital. As a consequence they are generally unrecognized as produclive capital
and, instead, acknowledged only as legitimate competence (e.g. as prestige). In short,
symbolic capital is an important way in which the various fonns of capital are legitimized.
Thus, a well-known noble, richly endowed with social capital-he is known· to more people
than he knows- is sought after precisely because of his prestige, which is, of course, the
acknowledgment of his ability to make his work of sociability highly productive. Tobe
known and visible to all, and tobe recognized by all because of distinctions or outstandingness,
is an essential part of noble power, and this is, essentially, symbolic capital.
This power is the „rational kerne!“ behind the incessa.nt striving of the early modern
middle class to enter the nobility, and the noble „squabbles“ over seemingly empty honours,
102 History and Societ y 2
as weil as tbe apparently „irrational“ pursuit of all olher forms of distinctions, such as
conspicuous consumption. It must be stressed, bowever, lhat lhe strategies may vary greatly
from individual to individual, depending on bis or her socialization, and tbat tbey do not
necessarily reflect a conscious ‚maximizing strategy.‘ Actually, from the narrow Standpoint
of economic theory, tbey may seem to involve great waste. However, in tbe long run,
in „real“ societies (as opposed to tbe constructions of economists) sociability canbe a solid
investrnent. In consequence, conflicts over distinctions sbould be regarded as informal
struggles for access to a resource which could, in turn, secure other resources, and generate
differential benefits, monetary or otherwise.
The social world of tbe nobility tllus tended to function as a symbolic system wbicb was
bigbly organized by a logic of differences. Symbolic hierarchies or distinctions, such as
the hierarchy of noble titles, formed tbe basis of social identity, so serving to define a sense
of distance from olhers, while at the same time providing a common framework within
which tbe members of nobility could understand their own and olhers‘ actions. In other
words, distinctions fonned tbe basis of tbe sense nobles bad of lheir place in t11e world.
Because agents generally tend to internalize lheir perceptions of tbeir own and otber’s
position in social space, social relations can become relatively permanent. Nevertbeless,
for various reasons, tbe legitimating principles of any particular „view“ that partitions the
social world is insecure and can always be called into question. For instance, in tbe case of
the nobility, rapid social mobility opened it to adulteration and lhereby required a redefinition
of status divisions. Categories of perception can lhen become tbe stakes in political
conflicts, wbicb basically take tlle form of struggles over t11e power to conserve or change
tbe social world by preserving or transforming tbe classifications lhrough which it is
perceived. As I will show below, such a process was also behind lhe conflict between the
Habsburgs and their nobility.
Preconditions for Status Mobility and Social Conflict
Struggle over social classification wilhin tbe elite, and between rulers and nobles, was an
ongoing process in early modern society. One major reason for this was tbat the nobility
continually bad to replace extinct members witb newcomers, whicb exposed it to adulteration
that could tllreaten its social identity and self-definition, which, as we have seen,
were essential to its functioning. However, social mobility did not automatically Iead to
overt conflict witbin tbe elite, or between nobles and rulers. Such conflicts were least likely
to occur when social mobility left unchanged the basic social structure of the nobility. And
Ibis stability would occur when the demand for entry into, or ascent within the nobility,
matched vacancies (comrnonly created by biological extinction, downward mobility, or
emigration) and wben social mobility did not lhreaten apportunilies to thc benefits accruing
from social status (for instance access to land and to court positions). I will define this
process of absorption as „structure preserving change.
„22
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 103
In contrast to this type of change, social mobility could Iead to a transfonnatimt of lhe
structure of the nobility, which nevertheless preserved lhe basic aristocratic nature of
society. The possibility lhat lhis „type preserving change oflhe social structure“ would Iead
to overt conflict was high because the tumover of members altered lhe distribulion of
resources within the nobility, and restricted access to various fonns of capital for at least a
portion of nobles. In short, it would Iead to what Jack Goldstone defines as „tumover and
displacement.“23 Since this might very weil threaten the nobility’s definilion of its place
in the communi ty, those who suffered displacement, but could still draw on some resources,
may turn to rebellion as an appropriatc strategy for preserving tbeir tbreatened way of life.
Consequenlly, the nobility, essentially a backward-Iooking class, could fmd itself in a
situation where it had to become politically „radical“ in order to remain socially traditional.
In other words, it became willing to cnvision fundamental political changes as necessary
for the preservation of its traditional position and way of life. The Bohemian Confederation
of 1 6 1 9, which the Lower Austrian nobility joined, should be viewed in Lllis light.24
During Llle half century before the uprising in 1620 rapid social mobility did Iead to
„type-preserving changes“ in Lhe social structure of Llte Lower Austrian nobility. This
played a crucial roJe in Lhe rebellion precisely becausc Llle Habsburgs intervened willl Lheir
own agcnda. Allllough Lheir actions were constrained by demographic change and economic
difliculties, and by Lhe power of the noble estates, Llle Habsburgs exerted a decisive
influence over Lllis process of sociaJ mobility. Since Llley did so overtly, and to Lhe delriment
of very specific sections of Lhe nobility, Lheir policy was a key factor in prompting revolt.
Holding a fonnal monopoly power over Llle granting of noble status, Llle Habsburgs, like
most olller early modern rulers, created Llle apportunilies for Status mobility. While social
advancement was always Lhe most common means for rulers to reward loyalty and service,
Llle possibilities for upward mobility widened in early modern Europe primaril1: because
of fiscal problems, warfare, and especially Lhe growU1 of central administrations. 5 However,
in contrast to France, lhe number of administrative offices at Llle Habsburg court
multi􀃣Iied only moderately by about one-fourth (from 422 to 531) between 1519 and
1 576. 6 Il is evident, nevertheless, Lhat Lhe increased need for offleials trained in Roman
law did facilitate Llle advance of11ew men into Lhe nobility. Otto Brunner has shown Lhat a
change in career mobility occurred in Lhe Austrian Iands around 1500. During Lhe later
Middle Ages, when Llle core of Lhe patriciate was composed of wcallhy merchants and
financiers, burghers moved into the nobility by connecting their wealth wilh royal offices,
usually in independent financial functions, such as Lhe collection of tolls and excise taxes,
which were frequenUy farmed out to Lllem (Amts/eure). After 1 500, by contrast, burghers
increasingly moved into the nobility by means of careers in the growing central administration.
27 This change is clearly evident from the composition of ncwcomers to Llle Lower
Austrian Ritterstand (estate of knights) between 1570 and 1620. Over lwo thirds of Llle new
knights were princely servitors, and only about a quarter ( 1 8) of them had made careers as
Amtsleute. Moreover, Llle majority of Lllese Amtsleute were, or had been, overseers of royal
104 History and Society 2
domains, and only a few held independent financial positions.
28
About anolher quarter of
the new knights in royal services beld positions in the central administration,
29
and about
a third were incumbents of offices in the Imperial or Archducal bousehotd?0
Most of the positions beld by the newcomers to the Ritterstand, wbether in tbe central
administration, the household, or as Amtsleute, required judicial training. From the mid
1590s tbere was a marked increase in the numberof newly admitted knights who completed
their judicial training with a doctoral degree, and who were able to rise at a faster pace than
before into high govemmental offices. Rapid career advancement like that experienced by
Baptist Linsmayr, for example, was unusual during the previous period. Linsmayr studied
at Padua and in 1567 received a doctorate in jurisprudence. Holding the title of Imperial
Councillor, he became procurator of the Lower Austrian Court Treasury (Hojkammerprokurator)
in 1579. During the same year be was ennobled, and a year later admitted to the
new Ritterstand. Linsmayr’s appointment as councillor of the Court Treasury in 1608
brought hirn the tiUe of baron with the predicate „von Greiffenberg.“
31
Equally dramatic
was the career of Johann Paul Krauss von Krausenegg, who held a doctoral degree in
jurisprudence, and moved from the position of councillor of the Lower Austrian Regiment
(1595) to councillor of the Court Treasury (1603). He was installed as Aulic Councillor in
1607 before he became president oftheCourt Treasury in 1611. Johann Paul was probably
ennobled around the turn of the century, admitted to the new Ritterstand in 1607, and, after
receiving the baronage i 1613, be was raised to the estate of Iords (Herrenstand) in
1616.
32
Although early modern rulers created the apportunilies for entry into the elite, certain
independent factors, such as favourable economic conditions, were essential to provide
them with a pool of men who were able and eager to enter the nobility. In short, there needed
to exist an urban patriciate who could afford to buy noble tiUes, or could obtain the
educational qualifications necessary to rise in administrative offices and finance a life style
appropriate for nobility. This was particularly irnportant in the Austrian territories, as some
landed property was a necessary condition for entrance into tbe Ritterstand and for ascent
to bigher ranks. In comparison to England,
33
the economic conditions in Lower Austria
were unfavourable for the advance of men from the mercbant dass and only a few of the
knights admitted between 1580 and 1620 bad actually risen from this group. The main
reason for the limited mobility of merchants was the decline of the political autonom?, and
financial strength of the cities in lhe hereditary Iands after the late fifteenth century. 4
Nevertheless, general conditions favourable to upward social mobility existed in sixteentJ1
century Lower Austria. Two fifths of tbe families belonging to the estate of knights in 1620
had been admitted during the past four decades, and a !arge proportion-aboul one third–of
them newcomers had been ennobled for only one or two generations (Tables 1 & 2).
35
However, tbe great majority of these new knights were descendants of burghers who had
pursued careers as municipal officeholders. Some were sons of prominent town councillors,
such as Michael Pittersdorfer, whose fat1ler bad served for more man tbirty years in the
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 105
town counci1 of Stein and K.rems.
36
In a few cases, engagement in a lucrative trade enab1ed
families to buy property and to send their sons to university to study law so as to facilitate
their entry into municipal and govemmenta1 offices. The Händ1s, for examp1e, having
possessed a foundry for almost a century, then bought proffrty, moved into municipal and
govemmental offices, and acquired a noble title in 1571.
In the absence of an adequate poo1 of rnen with the wherewithal necessary for upward
rnobility, rulers could provide favourites with grants of land and other capital. During the
sixteenth and seventeenth century, though, the Habsburgs were considerab1y restricted in
the distribulion of resources, since inflation and war had p1unged them into substantial
indebtedness?8
They did, nevertheless, offer positions to „foreigners“
39
at the Imperial
and Archducal courts, and this brought many nobles and burghers frorn other territories to
move to Lower Austria. Thus, between 1580 and 1620 only about one third of the
newcomers to the Ritterstand were indigenous to Lower Austria.
40
As I will show below,
this irnmigration was also slirnulated by religious conflict, and the desire of the Habsburgs
to distribute positions at court amongst the elite frorn sorne of their other territories.
While rnost of the newcomers to the estate of knights served in financial and judicial
functions, the rnost comrnon reason for ascent into the estate of Iords was advancernent to
an importanl position in the rnilitary and in the royal bousehold. The largest portion (one
fourth) of the newcorners to the Herrenstand were high offleials in the rnilitary administration,
or were comrnanders of regiments. Alban Grässwein, for instance, whose ancestors
had served the Habsburgs for almost a century in judicial, court, and military functions,
distinguished hirnself in several military campaigns in Hungary and the Netherlands.
Colonel and war councillor of Rudolf Il and Matthias, he was raised to baron in 1607. In
1612 he was admitted to the estate of Iords, and during that time he also obtained an
important royal fief, Orth an der Donau.
41
The preference of the old nobility for aclive
military service, or for positions in the military adrninistration, is evident throughout the
period. Such positions were a rerninder of the nobility’s feudal military functions and,
consequently, of special importance in distinguishing nobles from burgers, as well as to
signifying distinctions wirhin the nobility itself. Rapid social mobility rnade it more and
rnore imperative to stress such distinctions. For instance, about two fifths of the families
belanging to the estate of Iords in 1620 had been e1evated to baronial status since 1580
(Tables 3 & 4).
42
The second largest portion (one flfth) of the princely servitors admitted
to the Iords were offleials and dignitaries in the royal household. Wbile rnany of these
positions were conferred on an honourary basis, they placed their incurnbents in close
contact with the ruler and made them highly visible at court.
43
Salaries were clearly less
important to many new upper nobles than the social and syrnbolic capital they could derive
from court positions.
Whetber rulers wanted to expand their administration, to restructure their nobility, or
simply raise cash through ennoblements, they were, in principle, not compelled to concem
themselves with the question of whether there were sufficient vacancies within the nobility
106 History and Socicty 2
to absorb new members. However, a consequent growth in the size of nobility could easily
Iead to serious divisions within the elite, if not opposition to lhe monarch‘ s social policies.
Therefore, other things being equal, rulers who could notalso guarantee sufficient resources
to avoid the crowding out of members were wise to keep upward social mobility more or
less in line wilh genuine vacancies.
Vacancies within the nobility were most commonly created by extinction of families in
the male line. Emigration and downward social mobility also opened vacancies, although
the influence of bolh of these factors on social mobility are usually difficult to determine
from lhe records. It is clear, nevertheless, lhat during most periods of its history, the nobility
had to replenish itself with newcomers in order to continue its existence. Biological
extinction was not inevitable but seems to have depended to a considerable extent on the
socio-economic fortunes of each family. And, as fortunes changed over time, so did the
identity of the noble families. Thus, only 10 of the noble lines belanging to the upper
nobility of Lower Austria during the middle of the fifteenth century survived until the late
eighteenth century, and lhe Iosses among the lower nobility were certainly higher.
44
A Iist
drawn up by the noble Estates in 157 4 records 118 knightl y families that had died out during
the preceding fifty years,
45
and my own calculations reveal that during the following half
century about another half disappeared. A number of these families probably emigrated or
experienced downward mobility, but their proportion is unclear since such cases were
treated in most records as if they had become extinct.
46
The failure to reproduce was also common to other European noble families. In Brandenburg,
only 83 of 259 families who existed in 1540 were still around in 1800.
47
Tracing six
generations of Bohemian Iords, Jaroslav Hone calculated that from the early sixteenth
century about one third of the lines became extinct each generation.
48
In the county of
Forez in south-central France, only five of the noble lines of the twelfth century survived
to the French revolution.
49
Yet it is also apparent that during periods of population growtl1,
the nobility could counteract extinction to some extent by increasing the size of the
surviving families.
50
The other response was to admit new members. However, the
relationship between the disappearance of noble families and the Ievel of social mobility
was not always a direct one. The nobility of early modem Bayeux, for instance, experienced
the lowest upward mobility during the period of high population Iosses, while it endured
the largest influx of newcomers during the time of population expansion in the Iate sixteenth
century. Clearly, then, social mobility was not only determined by demographic processes,
but, as I will elaborate below, also by the political and fiscal needs of the crown.
Type-Preserving Changes of the Social Structure
Over the long run the Lower Austrian nobility proved able to regulate its own size. Thus
between 1415 and 1720/27 the number of noble lines increased only by about a quarter
(from 210 to 265). Extinct families were clearly replenished with newcomers, while a
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 107
growtb in tbe nurnber of individuals was usually followed by a decline in tbe nurnber of
lines (and vice versa). This was parliculary true during tbe period frorn 1580 to 1620, when
tbe general populalion expanded in tbe Austrian territories by atleast one fiftb. This led to
lhe growlh in tbe average size of noble families, prompting a 17 % increase in individual
members. However, a 15 % decline in tbe nurnber of lines prevented an expansion of tbe
noble order (Table 5)“
51
Once we differentiale between thc lower and upper nobility, the possibility of two distinct
responses to dernographic pressure crystallizes. On the one hand, the lower nobility lost
families and individuals mainly because of biological extinction, a loss which was made
up witb newcomers only as far as t11e availability of Ianded property permitted. Altogetber
tbe number of knightly families declined by one tllird (from 197to 128) between 1580 and
1620.
52 Despile tlle high rate of extinction-alrnost one half of tlle families disappeared
during tllese forty years-tlle Ritterstand could not restore its membership to tbe previous
Ievel because tbe population increase during tlle sixleentll century pul pressure on tlle
available land. While landed property, a prerequisite for admission to tlle Estates since
1572, was available for sale to newcomers due to U1e extinction of old lines, il was not
available on a scale sufficient to replace all exlinct families, because tbc number of children
of tllc remaining families had risen. On the otller hand, the extinction rate of tlle upper
nobility was insignificant. Because Ule rate of social mobility was greater than the vacancies
created by tlle disappearance of families, tbe estate of Iords expanded by more tha.n one
half, from 56 to 87 lines. Its individual members more than doubled, from 119 males over
tbe age of twenty in 1580 to 243 in 1620 (Table 5).
53 Evidently, tbe growtb in the average
sizc of the noble family, which had caused t11e decline in tlle total nurnber of knightly
families, because of added prcssure on tbe available land, did not prevent thc increase of
families in t11e estate of Iords. Since about one half of tlle new families admitted to tlle Iords
rose from U1e ranks of landed knights, tbe availability of property was of less sig.nifica.nce
for the rencwal of its mcmbership. However, U1e growth of tlle Herrenstand created furtller
difficulties for newcomers to t11e Ritterstand to purchase land from Ulis source. It appears,
then, tltat the lower nobility declined precisely because social advancernents into tlle upper
nobility exceedcd vacancics. In othcr words, while thc knights show a strong relationship
betwecn extinclion a.nd social mobility, the ascent of families to tlle estate of Iords was
unrclated to dernographic change. I will explain shortly tlle reasons for tllese divergent
developments
AIU10ugh tbe changes in tbe sizes of Bohemian and Moravian Iords and knights, and in
tlteir proportion, are uncertain,54 judging by tlle change in property owners between 1557
and 1615 it appears certain that the k:nights experienced Iosses-perhaps as many as one
t11ird55 -frorn which the Iords benefitt.ed in Moravia, while in Bohemia it was lhe towns and
tbe crown who made the gains.56 Certainly, tbe social structure and rate of social mobility
in the Bohemia.n Iands need furtllcr investigation in order to det.ermine tbeir roles in tlle
1620 uprising.
108 History and Society 2
In Lower Austria it is evident tbat significant type-preserving changes of the nobility’s
intemal social structure occurred during the late sixteenth and early seventeentb century.
The most apparent of these cbanges was the nwnerical decline of tbe knigbts and tbe growtb
of tbe Iords. In 1580 three and a half times as many lines, and more than twice as many
individuals, belonged to lhe estate of knights tban to the estate of Iords. B y 1620 the knights
only comprised a lhird (4 1 ) more lines than the Iords, while tbe Iatter already counted 1 9
more individuals. Neverlheless, the Ritterstand experienced a significant tumover in
membersbip. About two lhirds of the 92 families who had disappeared were replaced by
newcomers, solhat two fifths of the families living in 1620 had been admitted during the
past four decades (Table 2). Social ascent into lhe estate of Iords was even bigher: About
half oflhe families living in 1620 had been admitted after 1580 (Table 4). However, since
only a few (7) of the old Iords had become extinct, three quarters (42) of tbe families living
in 1580 still belonged to the estate in 1620.1L remains tobe seen how lhese changes affected
tbe religious and elhnic composition of tbe nobility.
In the meantime we can conclude that a simple comparison of lhe size of nobility over
time cannot reveal whelher social mobility was characterized by absorption, or whelher it
led to displacement of members. In lhe case of Lower Austria, it appeared at first sight as
if absorption was the prevalent pattcm. Once I differentiated between upper and lower
nobles, however, it became evident that ascent into the estate of Iords caused an expansion
in the size of its lines by one half between 1580 and 1620. This, together with the growth
in lhe average size of the noble family, put pressure on the available land, prompting a
numerical decline of the lines betonging to the estate of knights by one third. It must be
stressed, thougb, that these type preserving changes of the nobility’s intemal social
structure may not in themselves have provoked armed conflict between Habsburgs and
nobles, precisely because tbey could have occurred without social or economic displacement.
However, once we distinguish lhe effect social mobility had on Protestants and on
Catholic nobles, it becomes clear that the Habsburgs‘ policy of discrimination against the
Protestant nobility added a very dangerous ingredient.
Religion and the Struggle over Social Classification
As I have shown elsewhere,57 families in both estates grew in size and Ums confronted
problems of providing for more children. This led to increased competition within lhe
nobility for landed resources, and for positions at court and in the military, at precisely lhe
time when the Habsburgs were less able to distribute financial resources among nobles. It
also intensified the conflicts between Habsburgs and noble estates over political and
religious issues. Jack Goldstone has argued forcefully that a similar constellation of
problems caused state breakdown in seventeenth century England, France, and even Asia.
As with other European rulers, lhe Habsburg confronted increased expenditures due to the
changing nature of warfare and monetary intlation. Since lhe nobility also suffered from
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 1 09
inflation because o f fixed rents, i t showed considerable reluctance to grant increases in
taxes, so forcing the Habsburgs to borrow extensively.
58
The Reformation added an
explosive cullural dynamic to this Situation, which goes a long way toward explaining the
composition of the revolutionaries and the symbols through which they understood their
actions.
In 1 5 7 1 , under financial strain due to a new war with the Ouomans ( 1566-68), Maximilian
11 granted the Lower Austrian noble estates and their subjects the right to freely exercise
the Lutheran religion on their landed property and in their castles, in return for taking over
the repayment of royal debts in the amount of 2,500.000 GuU:Jen. Likewise, religious
concessions were granted to the noble estates of Upper Austria ( 1568), Inner Austria
( 1 5 72-78), and Bohemia (1575) in compensation for loan repayments.
59
At the same time
the noble estates managed to Iimit Habsburg power over social classification. As I will
show below, after 1 572 rulers and nobles held a precarious balance of power over social
classification, leading to a tug of war between them, and between Catholics and Protestants,
over Status promotion. Lacking direct legal means and adequate economic resources,
Maximilian Il’s successors sought to increase their authority by imposing their vision of
the social and political order through their power over social classification. They did so by
changing channels and rules of elite recruitrnent and, thereby, transformed the composition
of the noble estates. Their aim was to rid themselves of the unruly Protestant nobles by
promoting the rise of a new, loyal, and court-centred Catholic nobility. And this was the
prirnary reason for the previously observed growth of the estate of Iords.
The strategy of favouring Catholics in status promotion began to take definite shape after
thc Protestant nobility had gained religious autonomy. A clear line of action toward
confessional absolutism became imperative because the Lower Austrian nobility had also
managed, in 1572, to restriet the power of the Habsburgs over social classification.60
From
then on, two !arge categories of nobility existed, as a distinction was created between
nobility and noble estates (Figure 1 ) . Prcviously, any noble who possessed Dominikailand
(dcmesne land) was automatkally considered a member of the political estates. But after
1572 only those nobles who were formally admitted by representatives ofthe noble estates
had the right to attend political assemblies, to purchase tax-exempt land, and to claim trial
and judgment by their peers. Although the ruler still granted all noble titles, the noble
estates-where Protestants held a majority-now decided who was entitled to the important
benefits dcrived from noble Status (Figure 1). As I will demonstrate, th􀀮s development
created difficulties for the Habsburgs in pursuing their strategies and sharpened the conflict
between them and the Protestant nobility, as well as between Catholic and Protestant
estates. Nevertheless, for various reasons I shall also explain shortly, the new requirements
for admission to the estates, enacted after 1572, reveal little about confessional hostilities.
The nature of warfare, and the centralization efforts and financial difficulties of rulers,
helped facilitate increased social mobility in many other European countries.
61 This
prompted many nobilities to try to gain influence over regulating this flow ofnewcomers.
1 10 History and Society 2
Thus, the noble estates in various Gennan tenitories,
62
and in Bohemia, began to establish
more stringent rules for ascent to their order, and for mobility within it. The Bohemian
nobility actually secured the right to regulate the admission of new members in 1554, long
before the Lower Austrians.
63
Just how far they were able to Iimit Habsburg power over
social classification and mobility is uncertain. What is clear, though, is that the redefining
of the rules for social mobility was aimed largely at clarifying the demarcation boundary
of the noble estates and fixing the distinctions within it., rather than simply closing the
estates to newcomers.
64
However, the new rules did in fact make it more difficult for
commoners to simply assume noble status and gain access to collectively owned benefits.
In Lower Austria the new admission requirements stipulated that new members had to
sign a written declaration (Revers) promising that they would comply with the customs and
rules of the noble estates, and accept the leadership of their older peers. Naturally, these
customs stressed the distinctiveness of noble Iifestyle, such as abstention from usury.
65
The Status requirements werc clearly not designed to exclude newcomers and provided for
a relatively open social structure. While a simple diploma ofnobility sufliced for adrnission
to the estate of knights, applicants for incorporation to the estate of Iords were required to
hold the title of baron (Freiherr) or above (count or duke); in this case the regulations did
not specify a particular age prcrequisite for the tiUe. New nobles also could rise to the estate
of Iords within tl1ree generations.
Social distinctions within each estate were clearly defined as weil, and both the Herrenand
Ritterstand divided into a new and an old order in 1575. The estate of Iords required
that a family belong to the new estate for three generations before it was eligible to advance
into the old order.
66
Although no specific lineage requirements could be found for
admission to the old Ritterstand, i t appears that the third degree of rnernbership in the new
estate was also necessary before advancing to the old order. Immatriculation in thc old
estate conferred not only preslige to its occupants, but also important political powcrs. Thus
old members could assemble in separate sessions, where they debated certain issues
concerning their own order and, after 1612, decided the admission of newcorners. Moveover,
they had precedence in voting at the assemblies. Since decisions at all of the Estates‘
meetings were based on majority vote and the oldest member of each order would speak
and vote frrst, they thereby had the opportunity to influence and persuade thc remaining
voters.
67
Although the status requirernents did not provide tlle noble Estates with effective measures
to close their ranks, tlley were at least designed to ensure that new candidates had tlle
wherewitllal to imitate a distinctive noble life style. Thus, new members had to pay taxes
on a minirnum Glilt of 1 0 Pfund-a tax unit based on self-assessed seigneurial income from
the peasantry-and within a year they were to purchasc landed property worth at least that
amount.
68
A new member also had to pay certain admission fecs to the Estates‘ treasury.
A newcomer to tlle Ritterstand, if native to Upper and Lower Auslria, was obliged to pay
50 Thal er , and, if a „foreigner,“ 100 Thale r. The fe es required from t11e successf uI candida tc
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 1 1 1
to the Herrenstand were much steeper, as he was required to pay a total of 3,026 Gulden
if he bad previously not belonged to the estate ofknights. But if the candidate was advancing
from the new Ritterstand to the estate of Iords, bis fee was reduced to 1840 Gulden, and a
member of the old knights could rise at the low rate of 540 Gulden.69 Tbe high fee for
admission to the Iords were undoubtedly designed to control the flow of newcomers since
it represented three Limes the yearly income from a small estate, or important court office,
and about half the sum required to buy a srnall manor?0
Although tbe Lower Austrian
estates frequently reduced fees, the requirement could be used to elirninate undesirable
candidates. Moreover, the fees could be circumvented by using the Ritterstand as a stepping
stone to advance into the Herrenstand. In this case, the estate of knights retained greater
control over social advancement. Clearly, the admission fees appear to have been designed
to encourage the upward mobility of old, native knights and to make the direct admission
of new foreign nobility into tbe estate of Iords more difficult. Lacking a pool of native
Catholic nobles, the Habsburgs, as we shall see, f requently promoted Catholic nobility from
outside of the province to t11e baronage. Once they bad obtained the required property in
Lower Austria, they could not be denied direct admission to tbe estate of Iords. The steep
admission fees for direct entry into the Herrenstandwere thus designed to Iimit the massive
incursion of Catholic royal favourites. However, in one respect tbe new immatriculation
rules also encouraged the admission of royal protegces, as they stipulated previous or future
participation in a military campaign against the Ottomans, or in other scrvices for monarch
and country. This demand was clearly contradictory to the desire of tbe noble estates to
prevent thc entry and ascent of royal officials and officers. Since the new rules were drawn
up after negotiations between estates and the court, it is evident that the service requirement
demonstrates tbe success of tbe crown in retaining some means of influence over new
incorporation.
Clearly, thcn, the powers of the Protestant nobility to control upward social mobility were
Junited not only because the Habsburgs remained the sole grantors of noble titles, but also
because they bad managed to make service to monarcb and country a prerequisite for
admittance. It was thus difficult for the noble estates to deny the admission of Catholic
court nobles who beld the required noble diploma and possessed landed property. In 1612,
when fifty applicants waited for admission to the Ritterstand, the estates also realized that
the new rules bad not effeclively limited the incursion of „undesirables.“ They complained
that the regulations bad not been applied consistently, and that the newcomers bad found
means of „persuasion“ to be admitted without fulfilling the preconditions for membership.
lndeed, numerous new knights bad been ennobled for less than ten years at the time of
admission? 1 The knights therefore decided to raise tbe status requirements for new
members, who now bad to produce proof of nobility in the third degree (agnates and
cognates).72
Moreover, in future the documents proving the qualifications of a new
candidate bad to be investigated by the Landumermarschall (the higbest official of the
Ritterstand), the deputies, and three other knights before a decision could be made by at
1 1 2 History and Socicty 2
least twenty members of the old estate; a common assembly of knights bad to approve
their decision. A similar admission procedure was observed by tbe Herrenstand, except
tbat its highest official, the Landmarschall, passed on the application and document.ation
of the candidates‘ qualifications directl y to an assembly of twenty old Iords. The possession
of a baronial Status obviously eliminated the need for a lengthy investigation of social
origin. This also provided the Habsburgs with greater intluence over admissions to the
Herrenstand. In addition to the existing property requirements, the estates decided in 1 6 1 2
tbat landless knights bad to deposit a sum of money in the treasury-based on the candidate‘ s
wealth- until property was acquired. The estate of Iords fixed the deposit at 10,000 Gulden,
at 5 % interest, equivalent to the amount required to buy a small estate. It is evident then
that the regulations requiring the purcbase of property within a year had not been observed;
the money deposil provided the estates with a guarantee that t.axes would be paid by landless
nobles, and, more importantly, that the newcomers could afford to obtain the minimum of
land required in the first place.73
However, admission requirements were not consistently applied, eilher before 16 1 2 or
thereafter. Indeed, the proportion of landless newcomers increased after 1612, and two of
the three families admitted to the new estate until 1620 had been ennobled for just two
generations. Altogether, almost one tbird of the knights admitted between 1580 and 1620
had been ennobled for less than twenty years.74 As I will show below, the confessional
contlict was a primary reason for these inconsistendes.
The discussions leading to the new regulations conceming social distinctions and social
mobility during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century reveal little about confessional
hostilities. But they do show that t11e Protestant nobility feit threatened by adulteration.
Already by the mid-sixteenth century tbey began to complain about land sales to
„foreigners,“ who were coming to Vienna to serve in the central administration, and who
frequently moved into the nobility. The established, native nobility objected to tl1e new
origin and wealth of newcomers because these nobles „desire to be equal to the old Iords
and nobles … [and] are slowly buying up natives with their exorbitant wealth … , “ a practice
which they believed could only Iead to „innovation and the change of old traditions.“75
The old nobles especially resented the new court nobles, royal creations, wbose behaviour
at the political assernblies frequently rcvealed loyallies to the crown rather than to noble
interests. In 1572 the noble estates even asked Rudolph li to reject new nobles as
Officeholders unless they bad reached tl1e third degree of noble rank, but the emperor,
pretending not o understand t11e reasons behind the demand, objected?6
Most of the Protestant Opposition against the preference shown to Catl1olics in st.atus
mobility was carefully couched in secular terms, probably to conceal the symbolic and
economic significance Status had f1…; tbe survival of Protestantism. It is also possible tbat
they did not want to disturb the atmosphere of religious toleration that officially prevailed,
at least until l608. They clearly desired to prevent a massive incursion of sociaJ „inferiors,“
but the real and unstated objection to newcomers and foreigners was tl1at tl1e !arge majority
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 1 13
of them were Catholics and royal officeholders. This is less evident from Protestant rhetoric
than from the actual admission pattem. For example, the Protestant knights did not hesitate
to admit newcomers even without a noble diploma when it suited their purpose. Thus, in
1579 a number of Protestant burghers wbo had been involved in a demonstrative confessional
petition to the emperor, the so-called Sturmpetition, were admitted by the estate of
knights without possessing a noble diploma, in order to protect them from royal punishment.
77 The admission practices reveal further irregularities, indicating that the religious
conflict was of vital importance in explaining their erratic pattem. In 1608, mobility into
the new Ritterstand came to a near standstill after more than a decade of substantial influx
Figure 2). Moreover, the social, economic, occupational, and geographic background of
t11e knights was fundamcntally different after 1609, and became more homogeneaus
compared to the preceding decades. Thus, the new knights were of older nobility and had
eilher served in the army or held no position at all; they possessed smaller landholdings,
and tlley were frequently of foreign origin. Most importantly, nearly all of them were
Protestant. Evidently, their xenophobia was directed only against Catholic foreigners. This
contention is also supported by the alliance between tlle Bohemians and the Austrians in
1620.
A comparison of the admission frequency per confession and per decade clearly reveals
the tug of war between Protestants and Catholics over membership (Figure 3). Witll the
strengthening of tlle Counter-Reformation after 1580 the number of Protestant admissions
declined drastically. While the 1590s were again favourable for the advancement of
Protestants, the number of new Catllolic knights more than tripled during the following
decade. This advancement of Catholic kni􀂞hts was facilitated largely by the instalment of
a Catllolic Landuntermarschall in 1595. 8 Presiding over alt of the meetings of tlle
R itterstand, hecould influence admissions by encouraging andmanipulating the attendance
of knights favourable to certain candidates. After tlle events of 1608/9 a Protestant was
installed again as Landuntermarschatl
79
, which explains the drastic reduction in Catholic
admissions. Nearly alt of the knights incorporated to the new and the old estate after 1609
were Protestants.80
Since the crown increasingly favoured Cat110lics in Status promotion, it is not surprising
that the only step available to forestall the eventual domination of tlle estates by Cat110lics
was to advance older or foreign Protestant nobility to tlle Ritterstand. Seen in this
connection the complaints of the knights against new nobles, and the establishment of
stricter admission rules regarding noble status in 1612, appears to have bad a strong
religious ingredientrather than purely social roots. This contention can be further supported
by the fact that after 1612 the admission of Protestants to the old estate accelerated, even
though the candidates could frequently not fulfill the new property requirements. Most were
landless because they had recently irrunigrated from the hereditary Iands (especially from
Inner Austria) and from the Reich.81 A !arge proportion were officers because the military
became the only possible avenue of career mobility for Protestants after 1608.
82 While the
114 History and Society 2
incorporation of foreign landless nobles did not violate tbe admission mies, as long as tbey
obtained property witbin one year, recently created Catbolic nobles could be tumed away
on tbe grounds of tlle new Status requirements. This explains, why admissions to tbe new
Ritterstand ahnost ceased after 1608. In short., since the crown began to exclude native
Protestant burghers from Status promotion, tbc Protestant Ritterstand bad no choice but to
admit old foreign nobility if it wanted to retain a numerical predominance over tbe
Catbolics. Even tbough tbe Protestant knights were thus able to curtail Habsburg influence
over membership in tbe estate of knights, Catholic families mulliplied by about tbree
quarters (from 19 to 33), while Protestant families decreased by about one half (from 179
to 99). In other words, the Cat110lics had increased tbeir proportional strength from about
one tentb to one quarter, 83 and the diminution of the Ritterstand was largely a consequence
of Iosses among Protestants (Table 6).
The Habsburgs retained more influence over admissions into the estate of Iords. Here,
two fiftb of the familics admitted between 1580 and 1620 belonged to tbe Catholic faitl1.84
A comparison of mobility by decade and by confession into both noble estates reveals
similar but also contrary trends. Thus, after 1580 admissions of Protestants Iords also
suddenly declined. Evidently, the accession of Archduke Ernst to govemor (Statthalter) of
Lower Austria, and subsequentefforts to strengthen tbe Counter-Reformation, had the same
effect in botb estates. After 1590, however, the two noble estates appcar to have played a
confessional tug of war (Figures 4 and 5). While the number of Catholics admitted to the
estate of knights declined during the decade after 1 590, it increased in tbe estate of Iords.
The reason for this developmem in the Herrenstand must be sought in the succession of a
Catbolic (Sigmund von Lamberg) to the office of Landmarschall in 1592. Of some
importance, too, was that Catholics had already a stronger numerical position within the
estate of Iords. This made a reaction against the promotion of Catbolics more difficult. Yet,
even though the office of the Landmarschall remained in Catbolic hands tllfoughout tbc
period, Protestantmobility into tbe Herrenstandmore tban tripled betwcen 1600-09. Since
about half of the new Protestant Iords had advanced by means of military careers, il is clear
tbat tbe Ottoman war exerted some influence on their increased admission during this
period. The other, more irnportant, factor appears to have been Mattbias‘ attempts to muster
and reward Protestant support for his schemes against his brother, the emperor Rudolf II.
After Ibis period of rapid ascent within tbe noble ranks, the Protestants were suddenly
confronted with a complete reversal of royal policy, when Matthias, once in power,
excluded them from promotion to the rank of baronage and above. As a consequence,
Protestant admission to tbe Herrenstand declined by almost onc half between 1609 and
1619, and after 1613 only one Protestant farnily (Tattenbach) was incorporated.85
Obviously, tbe Landmarschall and the estate of Iords responded more readily to the status
promolians and pressures of the Eabsburgs tban did tbe knights. In the admission of tbe
Catbolic Georg Leonhard von Stozzing, for exarnple, it is known that Mattllias pressured
the Iords to advance his favourite.86 Moreover, tbe Herrenstand often had no choice but
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 1 15
to admit royal proteges, since the barons, frequently of older landed nobility, were much
more likely to fulfill all of the admission requirements, which did not specify the age of
baronial Status, than newly ennobled knights. However, since the Ritterstand-comprising
the poo1 of older Lower Austrian nobility eligible for Status advancement-was largely
Protestant, the Habsburgs had to promote lesser Catholic nobles from outside territories to
the baronage. Consequently three quarters of the Catholics entered the estate of Iords
directly. Moreover, the !arge majority (nine tenths) of them were first gcneration irnmigrants,
especially from Styria. while only half of the Protestants originated from territories
outside of Lower Austria.
87
In contrast, only half of the Protestant families incorporated
between 1580 and 1620 originated from territories outside of Lower Austria, and about
three fourth of them rose from the estate of knights. Although the nurober of Protestant
families slightly multiplied by about one third (from 44 to 60), the expansion of the Catholic
camp caused the proportional strength of Protestant families in tbe estate of Iords to decline
from about t11ree quarters to three fifths. Overall, Catholic baronial families almost tripled
(from 14 to 38), and rose proportionally from one-quarter to nearly two-fifth (Table 7).
1l1e Catholic gains in botl1 estates werc thus substantial and explain the activism of tllc
Catholic party, which increased during t11e early sevcnteenth century. It must be stressed
that this advance was rnainly t11e result of social mobility rather than of conversions, which
were surprisingly low.
88
By 1620 tlle cornbined Catllolic nobility had more tllan doubled,
and now comprised almost one third of tlle lines and about a quarter of the individual
members of the nobles Estates. Because of the moderate gains in t11e estate of Iords, tlle
combined Iosses of Protestants are less striking. Nevertheless. the number of families had
declined by one tllird (from 223 to 159), and tlle proportional strength of Protestant families
in the combined estates had fallen by 1 620, from about nine tenths to seven tentlls; tllc
individual members were reduced to one quarter. While thcy were still in tlle majority, the
Protestant nobility could legitirnately fearthat tlley soon would be outnumbered by Catholic
nobles. Considering tllat the lauer had a strong ally in thc first estate, tlle dergy, Protestant
power at tlle political assernblies was already threatened.
89
Tbe rise of new nobles, and the increase of foreign Catholic Iords, in themselves might
not have caused tlle rebcllion of tllc Protestant nobility in 1620. As 1 have shown elsewhere,
statistical analysis of tlle relationship between political affiliation and social background
suggests t11at noble status did not havc a significant int1uence on tlle politi􀄐al position of
tlle Protestant nobles. Old and new nobles were fairly evenly distributed arnong the tllree
Protestant parlies tllat forrned during 1620, indicating that antagonism between tlle new
and old nobility per se did not deterrnine political activism. The statistical analysis does
indicate, however, tllat tlle principal factor deterrnining whetller a Protestant took a neutral,
loyal, or opposing position toward Ferdinand 11 was office holding. None of tlle rebels held
offices, and tlle few Protestants who were still employed by the crown, eilher remained
loyal or Look a neutral position in the revoit.
90
Exclusion from office was thus the common
experience uniting the Protestant rebels, precisely because by 1 620 tlle Habsburgs had been
1 1 6 History and Socicty 2
more successful in changing the composition of its offleials to benefit Catbolics than in
manipulating the social structure, although changes in the latter were clearly essential for
altering the former.9 1
I suggest tbat such inequalities i n the distribution of social and economic resources were
also the major factor in polarizing the elite in Moravia and Bohemia. The evidence indicates
tbat in these territories the numerical growth of the Catholic faction after 1 600 enabled
Catholic nobles-frequently of foreign origin-to successfully compete wit11 native ProtestaniS
over important offices.
92
This issue must be further investigated, but it is already
evident that between 1 594 and 1604 the Catholic nobility acquired all the important
positions in Moravia.
93
Moreover, confessional parity in the distribution of offices was a
major demand of the Bohemian and Austrian Confederates. Access to royal office became
generally more important during the sixteenth century to Supplement noble incomes, to
provide for numerous sons, and to gain access to crucial social, cultural, and symbolic
capital at the ncw centres ofpower. It is Ums not surprising that the attilude of the Protestruns
hardened, and they tried to prevent the preferential treatment of Catholics in Status and
office promotion. This also reinforced the fears and intolerance within the Catholic party,
and ossified relations between Protestanis and Habsburgs.
Conclusion
Clearly, the changes in the nobility‘ s social structure was not a causal factor separate from
tbe economic, cultural, and political proble1ns underlying the rebellion of 1 620. Because
the various forms of „capital“ were mutually reinforcing, each being more or less dependenL
upon the other for the production, or reproduction, of noble power, a restriction on the
access to one form of capital also meant a constraint on the access to profits (monetary or
otherwise) derived from the other forms of capital. Consequenlly, exclusion from the
benefits of status mobility represented an attack not only on the religion, culture, and sociaJ
predominance of the Protestant nobility, but on its continued existence as an elite. In short,
social mobility was of utmost importance to the early modern elite because Status was a
resource crucial for generating a whole syndrome of benefits, and because social distinctions
were an essential part of noble power and legitimacy. lt is understandable, then, why
redefining the rules and channels of elite recruitment could becomc a focal point in the
conflict between Habsburgs and Protestant nobles. The party who managed to transform
or conserve existing social categories in ways that conformed to its own advantage would
necessarily also alter social and power relations in its favour.
Although such struggles between rulers and nobles over social classification were an
ongoing process in early modern society, largely because of continual, and often rapid,
social mobility, I maintain that really serious conflicts were most likely to occur when
type-preserving changes in the social structure Iead to the displacement of a definite portion
of the elite and did so very quickly. During the half century before the rebellion of 1620,
MacHardy: Social Mobility and Noble Rebellion 1 17
the Iransformation of the internal structure of the Lower Austrian nobility did Iead to the
social displacement of the Protestant majority, and this played a crucial roJe in the uprising.
Status mobility into the Lower Austrian noble estates thus provides an excellent case
study to show the complexities of social change in early modern Europe. Nearly everywhere,
social advancement accelerated significantly after the mid-sixteenth century. While
similarcauses Iay behind these processes, they were not always linearer identical. Although
the Habsburgs frequently rewarded creditors with noble titles, they did not, like the French
rulers, resort to the sale of titles to cover their debts. High social mobility in Lower Austria
did not signify the rise of a wealthy, commercial bourgeoisie, as it did in England. Instead,
it was primarily the increased need for men trained in Roman law to work in the central
administration that led the Habsburgs to aceeierate Status mobility. The new nobles who
entered the estate of knights had mostly risen by virtue of their judicial training and
administrative functions in municipal offices to positions in the central administration, or
in traditional Ämter. After 1609, however, it was mainly Catholics who benefited from
these recruitment policies.
As did European rulers generally, the Habsburgs obviously exerted considerable influence
on social change. While different personalities, and conflicts within the dynastic farnily,
left their mark on the social structure, it is also evident that the rulers‘ actions were limited
by structural factors, notably demographic and economic change. The population growth
of the sixteenth century put pressure on the available land, thereby limiting social mobility
into the lesser nobility. Because the noble population increased, and landholdings-a
prerequisite for membership-were frequently small and indivisible, the knights could not
replace all of the Iosses they suffered from biological extinction. Nevertheless, the high
morlality rate facilitated the admission of a !arge number of new families to the estate of
knights. Demographie change exerted less influence on mobility into t11e Herrenstand
because the Iords could advance knights who already possessed landed property, and
because the Iords‘ Iandholdings still allowed for some divisibility. As a consequence, the
upper nobility could expand in size at the expense of the lesser nobility.
The Habsburg rulers managed to turn these developments to their advantage and manip
ulate the transfonnation of the nobility’s internal structure to benefit a new, presumably
more loyal, Catholic nobility. They were in fact less interested in creating a new nobility
than in reestablishing confessional confonnity amon􀀓 the elite, which they considered an
essential prerequisite to strengthen their authority. 4 Since they had been forced by
financial considerations to pennit religious freedom, they had to use iheir power as
distributors of social capital to subdue the Protestant nobility. But they erred in the rapidity
with which they implemented their policy. The expectations of the Protestant nobility had
been considcrably raised after the conciliatory tennination of differences in 1608/9, and by
the rewards Mattbias bestowed on the Protestants who sided with him against Rudolf. They
were even morc disappointed when they suddenly realized that in the future the Habsburgs
were detennined to distribute social resources only to Catholics. Instead of bringing about
1 18 History and Society 2
the cbange gradually, Matthias and Ferdinand irnplemented their strategies for allainin§
dominance at a speed that minimized the possibility of appropriate cultural adjustment.
9
The transformation occurred despite the fact that in 1 572 the Protestant estates bad been
successful in limiting the power of the Habsburgs over social mobility. Their aim in
establishing a dual system of nobility and dual estates was to strengthen and clearly define
social distinctions, rather than close the noble estates to advancing commoners. Certainly,
the establisbed Protestant nobility distrusted and resented the new nobility. However, the
conflict of interest between new and old nobles beeval nobilities. Two
articles, on Hungarian and Austrian nobles of the ancien regime Iook at social mobility and
estate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The volume closes with an essay by
Istvan Hajnal on the end of the noble-corporatist world in ninetcenth-century Hungary.
With publishing three articles of the gencTations pTeceding OUTS, we wish to bow tho those
who taught us, without wanting to hide that t11eiT questions and answers are not necessarily
ouTs. By printing papeTs of younger scholars, in turn, we hope to pTesent Tecent Tesearch in
the area on topics that are discussed among social historian eveTywheTe.
The volume editoT wishcs to express his gratitude to those friends and colleagues who
assisted in the – oflen almost unscrmountable – task of translating and editing the Czec ,
Magyar and Polish contributions: Catherine Allen, Sirnon Carne, Tamas Domahidy, Vera
Gathy, Ryszard Grzezik, and Paul Knoll. Needless to say that he alone feels Tesponsible
foT the remaining shortcomings, which are, pTobably, many. Maybe, we shall publish once
a volume only on the intricacies and pitfalls of translating medieval and medievalist texts.
H & S
is a series of occasional papers published by the lstvän Hajnal Society of Historians, in
cooperation with the Medium JEvum Quotidianum Society (Krems, Austria), the Spolecnost
hospodru’sky dejiny [Society For Economic History] in Prague.
Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der Kulturabteilung des Amtes der Niederösterreichischen
Landesregierung
Editors:
Vera Bäcskai, ELTE Btk, Budapest, Pf. 107, H-1364.
Jänos M. Bak, Dept. of Medieval Studies, Centrat European University,
Huvösvölgyi ut 54, 1021 Budapest
Gerbard Jaritz (for MJEQ), Körnermarkt 13, A-3500 Krems
Editorial consultants:
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Farag6 (Miskolc), Susan Glanz (Brooklyn, NY), Monica Glettler (Municb), Heiko Haumann
(Baste), Tamäs Hofer (Budapest), Gerbard Jaritz (Vienna), Charles Kecskem􀃚ti
(Paris), B􀃚Ia K.Kiraly (Highland Lakes, NJ), György Köver (Budapest), Ludolf Kuchenbuch
(Bochum), Jaroslav Länik (Prague), Hans Medick (Göttingen), Walter Pietzsch
(Wiesbaden), Martyn C.Rady (London), Herman Rebe! . (Tucson, AZ), Helga Schutz
(Berlin), Julia Szalai (Budapest), Heide Wunder (Kassel).
Manuscripts and inquiries (including advertising) should be addressed to Andras Csite,
Managing Editor HISTORY & SOCIETY c/o: Hajnal Istvän kör, ELTE BTK, Budapest
Pf. 107, H-1364. E-mail: csite@osiris.elte.hu
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ISBN 963-04-2014-7
Coverpage idea by György Köver
Computer setting and formatting by Gäbor Kelemen
Cover design Csilla Mätrai based on tbe Ebsdorf Mapamundi.
© Hajnal Istvän Kör, Budapest, 1994.